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ii. 
Abstract 
In 1940, Bernard Lonergan was forced to flee Rome quickly. He took a few pages of an essay on 
Newman, seven essays and sketches later found in File 713, a set of handwritten notes on his 
reading of Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Customs, and a set of hand written 
sketches titled “General Ethic [Metaphysics of Customs].” These sketches have gone relatively 
untouched within the body of existing scholarship on Lonergan. First, this project establishes the 
significance of these sketches, dates their composition, and discusses a context for understanding 
their relevance. Secondly, using the functional specialization of research, it provides preliminary 
research notes that will aid in a future interpretation of the text. Thirdly, it establishes the 
sketches as an early outline of Lonergan’s understanding of the metaphysic of ethics found in 
chapter 18 of Insight. The project highlights connections between the sketches and Lonergan’s 
thoughts on Kant, the dialectic of history, and Ethics.  
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Introduction 
Inspired by his reading of Kant’s I Fondamenti della Metaphysical dei Costumi, 
Lonergan composed a set of hand written sketches titled “General Ethic [Metaphysic of 
Customs].” These sketches appear to be an outline for a book and offer Lonergan’s own thoughts 
on the issues presented in Kant’s I Fondamenti della Metaphysical dei Costumi. When quickly 
fleeing Rome, Lonergan chose to take the sketches with him and left behind a large majority of 
his work. Somehow, the sketches have been overlooked by Lonergan scholarship. I hope that my 
project will inspire others to consider the sketches in light of their relationship to the dialectic of 
history, Lonergan’s understanding of Kant, his early development, and his understanding of 
Ethics. 
My project highlights the significance of the sketches, especially in relation to the “Essay 
in Fundamental Sociology,” Lonergan’s notes on Kant, and chapter 18 of Insight. Following a 
discussion of their significance, I establish the dating of the sketches and then provide some 
initial context surrounding their composition. In the second chapter, I provide a transcribed version 
of the sketches. I rely heavily upon Robert Doran’s transcription of the handwritten sketches for this 
chapter, and offer a few amendments to ensure the sketch looks as close to the original file as 
possible. 
In chapters three and four, I provide some primary data (research notes) that I believe will 
be useful for future interpretation of the text. My project is very preliminary in its approach, I use 
Lonergan’s functional specialization research as a method of approach to the sketches. In these 
chapters, I provide research notes to aid in a more clear understanding of references that 
Lonergan makes throughout the sketches. These, I believe, will be useful for future 
interpretations of Lonergan’s early work, its place in his development, his relationship to Kant’s 
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thought, his Ethics (as relevant to chapter 18 of Insight), the notion of the dialectic of history and 
other questions which certainly will emerge in future Lonergan scholarship.  
The file is divided into three sketches, the second sketch is clearly a revised version of 
the first. The third sketch however, although evidently related to the first two sketches, is a 
separate outline for Lonergan’s understanding of happiness. I explore the first sketch in chapter 
three and compare it to the second sketch in chapter four. I also examine the third sketch on 
happiness in this chapter. 
My final chapter connects the file to chapter 18 of Insight and establishes the sketches as 
an early outline of the notion of ethics found in that chapter. The sketches are evidence that 
Lonergan began thinking about ethics long before the composition of chapter 18 of Insight. With 
all of this is mind, I turn your attention to chapter one: “Significance and Context: Sketches on 
the Metaphysic of Customs.” 
3 
Chapter One: Significance and Context: Sketches on the Metaphysic of Customs 
I stumbled upon File 1300DTE030/A13 while doing research at the archives at the 
Lonergan Research Institute. The file consisted of a series of notes headed with the title “General 
Ethic [a Metaphysic of Customs].”1 Having recently explored chapter 18 of Insight I 
immediately saw a connection between the file and Lonergan’s account of ethics in that chapter. 
The following chapter highlights the significance of the GE sketches and discusses a context for 
understanding their relevance for Lonergan’s development.   
While the GE sketches are mentioned by both Liddy and Mathews in their discussion 
of Lonergan’s development in the 1930’s, neither treats the sketches in any depth. Yet, as I 
hope to show, the sketches provide us with evidence for locating an important moment in the 
development of Lonergan’s thinking in the 1930’s and as such, deserve a more detailed analysis. 
Lonergan’s impetus for writing the sketches was his reading of Kant. In 1934 he had written a 
review of Leo Keeler’s book The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant, which provided an 
occasion for him to delve into Kant.2 Adjacent to the GE sketches in the archives was a set of 
Lonergan’s notes titled “E Kant - I Fondamenti della Metapysica des Costumi.”3 The notes were 
on the Italian translation of Kant’s Grundlegung Metaphysik der Sitten. It is highly probably, 
then, that the GE sketches were written around the same time and in response to his reading of 
Kant. Both files, then, are significant for understanding Lonergan’s response to Kant and provide 
an early indication of how Lonergan’s approach to ethics differs from Kant. As we shall see, the 
1 Bernard Lonergan. “General Ethic [Metaphysic of Customs]” [Lonergan Archive File 13000DTE030 / A13]. 
Referred here after as: GE sketches.  
2 Leo W. Keeler. “The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant. A Historical and Critical Study.” University of 
California: Apud Aedes Pontificiae Universitatis Gregorianae, 1934. 
3 Bernard Lonergan. “Notes on E. Kant - I Fondamenti della Metaphysical dei Costumi. Trad. Giacomo Perticone - 
ed. Signorelli. Roma 1926” [Lonergan Archive File 12000DTIE30 / A12]. Referred here after as: KN.  
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GE sketches also show the influence of the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology,”4 written in the 
spring of 1934, and would also have some significance in an analysis of the development of 
Lonergan’s philosophy of history. Lonergan wrote the seminal early essay “Pantôn 
Anakephalaiôsis,” in January of 1935.5 These notes, then, were composed in the period between 
his two early essays in dialectic of history. Finally, for anyone interested in the development of 
Insight, the GE sketches are clearly related to the content of chapter 18, ‘The Possibility of 
Ethics.’6 At the very least, the sketches are important for us because they were important to 
Lonergan.  
I have divided this chapter into two sections. The first section considers the overall 
significance of the GE sketches. The second explores the context surrounding their composition. 
Initial Significance of the GE Sketches 
Lonergan studied at the Gregorian University in Rome from 1933 to 1940. He was 
destined for a philosophy doctorate when, in response to a need for theology professors in his 
home Jesuit province of Upper Canada, his superiors informed him in 1938 that he would be 
switching to theology. In the fall of 1938 he began his doctoral thesis in theology on the notion 
of gratia operans in the thought of Aquinas.7 Because of the advance of the German army in 
4 Bernard Lonergan. ‘Essay in Fundamental Sociology’ in Lonergan’s Early Economic Research (ed. Michael 
Shute). (2010), 15-44. Referenced here after as: EFS. 
5 Published as Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis (The Restoration of All Things). Edited with an introduction by Frederick E. 
Crowe. Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 9:2 (1991) 139–72. The full original title of the essay is “Pantôn 
Anakephalaiôsis: A Theory of Human Solidarity A Metaphysic for the Interpretation of St. Paul A Theology for the 
Social Order, Catholic Action, and the Kingship of Christ in Incipient Outline.” The essay in discussed in detail in 
Michael Shute. The Origins of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectic of History, (Lanham MD: University Press of 
America, 1993), 99-109. Referenced here after as: OLNDH. 
6 Bernard Lonergan. Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan Volume 3 
(ed. by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran). (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992). Hereafter: CWL3. 
7 The thesis was entitled Gratia Operans: A Study of the Speculative Development in the Writings of St. Thomas of 
Auin and published in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 1 Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in 
the Thought of Thomas Aquinas. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).    
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Italy, Lonergan had to flee Rome and return to Canada, taking his thesis materials, a few pages 
of a 30,000 word essay on Newman,8 seven essays and sketches later found in File 713,9 the set 
of handwritten notes on his reading of Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Customs10 and 
the sketches titled “General Ethic [Metaphysic of Customs].” Lonergan’s departure from Rome 
was somewhat rushed, “Lonergan was to embark on the ship Washington at Naples, Saturday 
May 18th. He would have defended his thesis according to the earlier plan, on May 17th, The 
Washington, however, was fully booked, so he had to get to Genoa and depart from there, on 
May 15th aboard the Conti di Savoia.”11 Acting quickly, Lonergan discarded almost all of a long 
essay on Newman, his work on economics and the first 94 pages of the “Essay in Fundamental 
Sociology.”12 We can assume then, that the files he selected to take were of great significance for 
him.13 Given the importance of his later breakthroughs in economic theory in 1942 and 1944, the 
fact that Lonergan left behind a substantial essay on Newman and whatever work he was doing 
in economics and yet took the history materials, the set of notes on Kant, and the GE sketches is 
on the face of it quite astounding. It would be interesting to know Lonergan’s thoughts as he 
made a decision to take these particular items. 
Lonergan’s notes on Kant and File 713 have been examined within the existing body of 
Lonergan scholarship. The work of Frederick Crowe, overall, provides the most extensive 
8 See OLNDH, 73.   
9 File 713 is available online from the Lonergan Archive. 
10 KN. The Kant title is usually translated in English as Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Working from 
the Italian translation, Lonergan refers to his own ethics project as a ‘metaphysic of customs.’ 
11 Pierrot Lambert and Philip McShane, Bernard Lonergan His Life and Leading Ideas, (Vancouver: Axial 
Publishing, 2010), 64-65. See also: http://www.lonerganresearch.org/about-us/about-bernard-lonergan/ 
12 OLNDH, 68. 
13 While not all contents of File 713 were written prior to 1940 - it includes, for instance, notes on Toynbee’s A 
Study of History, which we know Lonergan read after he arrived in Canada – the file contained seven essays or 
sketches on the topic of history all written between 1934 and 1938. These are: item 2, "Analytic Concept of History" 
item 3, "Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis" item 6, "Sketch for a Metaphysic of Human Solidarity" and "Pantôn 
Anakephalaiôsis - A Theory of Human Solidarity"; item 7, "Analytic Concept of History, In Blurred Outline"; item 
9, "Philosophy of History"; item 11, "A Theory of History"; and item 12, "Outline of an Analytic Conception of 
History". See OLNDH, 46. See pages 67-71 for a discussion of the dating.      
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discussion. His short work Lonergan provides an overview of Lonergan’s work.14 His various 
essays on Lonergan’s development have been collected in Appropriating the Lonergan Idea 
(1989).15 In addition, his last work, Christ and History: The Christology of Bernard Lonergan 
from 1935 to 1982, provides a further resource on Lonergan’s development in his thinking on 
theology in the 1930’s. William Matthews’ book Lonergan’s Quest: a Study of Desire in the 
Authoring of Insight,16 is designed to act as a biography of Bernard Lonergan’s life and provides 
a broad outline of the highlights of Lonergan’s development up to 1953, as does Richard Liddy’s 
Transforming Light. 
Despite the extent of the secondary literature on Lonergan, there is relatively little 
scholarship that devotes its primary attention to Lonergan’s development prior to 1940. Of this 
literature, none deals directly with Lonergan’s early development in ethics. While Crowe, 
Mathews, and Liddy all consider Lonergan’s work in the 1930s, it is the work of Michael Shute 
and Patrick Brown that focuses explicitly on this period. Shute’s three books on Lonergan: The 
Origins of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectic of History, Lonergan’s Discovery of the Science of 
Economics,17 and Lonergan’s Early Economic Research18 all concern the early Lonergan. 
Patrick Brown has contributed three important essays: “System and History in Lonergan's Early 
Historical and Economic Manuscripts,”19 “Implementation In Lonergan's Early Historical 
14 Frederick E. Crowe. Lonergan in the Outstanding Christian Thinkers Series (Liturgical Press, 1992).   
15 Frederick E. Crowe. Appropriating the Lonergan Idea (ed. Michael Vertin). (Washington: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1989).   
16 William Matthews. Lonergan’s Quest: A Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight. (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2005). Referenced here after as: LQ. 
17 Michael Shute. Lonergan’s Discovery of the Science of Economics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010). 
18 Lonergan’s Early Economic Research, edited by Michael Shute (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011). 
Referenced here after as: LEER. 
19 Patrick Brown. “System and History in Lonergan's Early Historical and Economic Manuscripts” Journal of 
Macrodynamic Analysis 1 (2001): 37-76.   
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Manuscripts,”20 and “'Aiming Excessively High and Far': The Early Lonergan and the Challenge 
of Theory in Catholic Social Thought.”21 To these works we can add Joseph Komonchak’s essay 
“Lonergan's Early Essays on the Redemption of History.”22 
Generating a comprehensive outline of the development of Lonergan as a thinker is a 
difficult task. As Crowe argues: “The course of development, however, is not easy to follow; for 
although there are extremely revealing documents, there are also great blank spaces. Still, that 
will add zest to an already fascinating study.”23 The GE sketches may help fill in a small portion 
of the blank spaces to which Crowe alludes. 
The GE sketches are virtually untouched as a scholarly source. I have located a brief 
mention of them in Shute’s book Lonergan’s Discovery of the Science of Economics24 and 
reference to them in the bibliography of his Lonergan’s Early Economic Research25, and The 
Origins of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectic of History.26 The sketches are also referenced in 
the bibliography of Matthew’s Lonergan’s Quest: a Study of Desire in the Authoring of Insight27, 
and in Liddy’s Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan.28 Also, there 
are two references to Lonergan’s use of Ecclesiastes 4:1-3 in the second sketch,29 and a 
20 Patrick Brown. “Implementation in Lonergan’s Early Historical Manuscripts” Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis 
3 (2003): 231-249. http://www.mun.ca/jmda/vol3/brown.pdf.   
21 Patrick Brown. “Aiming Excessively High and Far': The Early Lonergan and the Challenge of Theory in Catholic 
Social Thought” Theological Studies, 72, (2011).   
22 Joseph Komonchak. “Lonergan's Early Essays on the Redemption of History. Lonergan Workshop 10 (1990): 
159-178.   
23 Frederick Crowe. Developing the Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes. Edited by 
Michael Vertin. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 37.  
24 Lonergan’s Discovery of the Science of Economics, 69. 
25 LEER, 165. 
26 OLNDH, 188. 
27 LQ, 535. 
28 Appears as a footnote in: Richard Liddy. Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan 
(Michael Glazier Books, 1993), 78.  
29 Patrick Brown references Lonergan’s use of Ecclesiastes 4:1-3 in “General Ethic [Metaphysic of Customs]” in 
“Implementation in Lonergan’s Early Historical Manuscripts” Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis 3 (2003): 231-
249. A similar reference to the same Ecclesiastes passage appears as a footnote in James L Marsh and Anna J. 
Brown (editors) Faith, Resistance, and the Future: Daniel Berrigan's Challenge to Catholic Social Thought, (New 
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transcription of the hand-written notes by Robert Doran.30 With the exception of these 
references, the content and significance of the GE sketches have not been explored in the 
published secondary materials on Lonergan.   
Taken as a whole, the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology,” “Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis,” 
Lonergan’s notes on Kant and the GE sketches are, then, highly significant primary sources for 
understanding the development of Lonergan’s thought on the metaphysical foundations of ethics. 
If nothing else, the sketches are significant because they clearly indicate that Lonergan began 
thinking about ethics early in his career; it was not a topic that first occurred to him in the writing 
of Insight.  
Context 
Now that I have established some initial significance of the GE sketches, I wish to 
provide some context surrounding their composition. In what follows, I locate the file as a slice 
of development between the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” (1934) and “Pantôn 
Anakephalaiôsis” (1935). After I have established this timeline, I will provide an overview of 
Lonergan’s life at the Gregorian University in the mid-nineteen thirties. I will highlight major 
influences on Lonergan during his studies in Rome, provide glimpses into his course schedule, 
note changes occurring at the Gregorian University during Lonergan’s stay, and provide a brief 
overview of Lonergan’s place of residency in Rome.   
York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 352.  
I have divided the file into three sets of sketches, see Chapter 3. 
30 Robert Doran’s transcription of the 13000DTE030/A13 file, available online from the Lonergan Archive. File 
1300ADTE030/A13. Referenced here after as: DT. 
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Establishing a Timeline 
With the exception of a letter written by Lonergan to Father Keane, the Reverend Father 
Provincial,31 the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology,” and Lonergan’s notes on Kant, there are no 
internal or external references that we can use to precisely date the GE sketches. When we 
consider the contents of File A13, the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology,” the notes on Kant, and 
the 1935 letter to Fr. Keane, placing the composition of the GE sketches between the “Essay in 
Fundamental Sociology,” written in the spring of 1934, and “Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis,” dated 
1935,32 seems the most probable conclusion.  
Lonergan composed the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” in the spring of 1934, sent 
the letter to Fr. Keane on January 22, 1935 and completed “Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis” sometime 
in 1935. Prior to the completed letter, Lonergan wrote several lengthy drafts of the letter 
detailing what he regarded as his ‘radical’ understanding of metaphysics.33 Unfortunately, these 
drafts are unavailable but are noteworthy because they indicate the importance of Lonergan’s 
letter to the Reverend Father Provincial. He took his time to compose the letter.  Lonergan was 
not writing casually or expressing quickly passing thoughts, he was sharing his fundamental 
‘radical’ view with an important person; Fr. Keane is important with respect to his position and 
progress within the Jesuit order. The thoughts present in the letter are well developed. Lonergan 
wanted to ensure that he expressed himself in an appropriate manner that would be well received 
by his superior.  
The letter establishes that Lonergan had been thinking about Kant. In the letter, Lonergan 
31 Letter from Bernard Lonergan to Reverend Father Provincial. Vis del Seminario 120, Roma 119, Italy. January 22, 
1935. Referenced here after as: BLFK. 
32 The original PA manuscript was dated 1935 in Lonergan’s handwriting. See OLNDH, 99.   
33 BLFK, 2.  
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reports that he has recently reviewed Father Keeler’s book.34 Robert Doran reports that a review 
of Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Customs was discovered alongside of Lonergan’s 
notes on the Metaphysic of Customs. Robert Doran also notes that Lonergan’s file on Kant and 
the GE sketches, were written on the same style of paper.35 Given this fact and the contents of 
the notes and sketches themselves, it is clear that we can link the GE sketches, the notes on Kant, 
and the Keeler review.   
In the letter to Keane, Lonergan states his interest in metaphysics: 
I can give you my present position in a few words. It is definite, definitive; and 
something of a problem. The current interpretation of St. Thomas is a consistent 
misinterpretation. A metaphysic is just as symmetrical, just as all-inclusive, just 
as inconsistent, whether it is interpreted rightly or wrongly. The difference lies 
in the possibility of convincing expression, of making applications, of solving 
disputed questions. I can do all three in a way that no Thomist would dream 
possible. I can prove out of St. Thomas himself that the current interpretation is 
wrong.36  
The GE sketches appear to be, at least in part, an attempt of “convincing expression, of making 
applications, of solving disputed questions.”37 
Lonergan does not take complete ownership of his emerging ‘radical’ understanding of 
metaphysics. He attributes the realization of the interpretative error to Father Joseph Maréchal, 
who reigned in Lonergan’s house in Louvain.38 Lonergan wrote that Father Maréchal’s views 
were frowned upon and often dismissed as “obviously wrong.”39 He notes that Father Maréchal’s 
views deal with the abstract, not the concrete, therefore they cannot be “obviously wrong” as 
34 Leo W. Keeler. “The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant. A Historical and Critical Study.” University of 
California: Apud Aedes Pontificiae Universitatis Gregorianae, 1934. 
35 DT, 1.  
36 BLFK, 3. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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nothing in the abstract is concrete and therefore cannot be obvious.40 Although Lonergan does 
not take ownership of the initial idea, he offers a clear defense of Father Joseph Maréchal and 
develops the idea further in a way that Maréchal was unable to do. Lonergan offers a new 
interpretation of metaphysics, one he believed was grounded in an accurate interpretation of St. 
Thomas. He used it to solve problems and to make new applications.41 The GE sketches appear 
to be an attempt at accurately interpreting and critiquing Kant’s understanding of the metaphysic 
of customs, and provide a glimpse of how Lonergan’s ‘radical’ understanding of metaphysics 
might produce a new understanding for the metaphysic of ethics.  
If my assumptions are correct, the composition of the GE sketches can be dated prior to 
January 22, 1935. As already established, Lonergan composed “Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis” in 
1935. I argue that the sketches were written prior to the Pantôn essay. There is a possibility that 
the sketches were composed after the Pantôn essay, but this seems very unlikely due to the 
shortage of time that Lonergan had for personal study. Furthermore, the most obvious connection 
is with the Keeler review which was written in 1934.  
In any case, William Matthews notes that Sunday afternoons were the only time that 
Lonergan had for personal study: 
In a long letter to Henry Smeaton dated 9 May 1934, Lonergan recounts his 
experience of the year, describing his view of the rooftops, the noise of the 
traffic, and the villa Borghese. He writes amusingly about the lecturers, the 
difficulty of attending a morning of lectures on an empty stomach and of 
recovering from a soporific dinner in time for a 4 p.m. lecture. On Thursdays 
they had to relax outside the house, so the only time he had for some form of 
study was on Sunday afternoon. The lifestyle was not suited to private study, and 
Deus Scientiarum Dominus had simply added worry to a reposeful way of life. 42 
40 Ibid. 
41 Here we see Lonergan beginning to think about the functional specializations of Interpretation and Dialectic. 
42 LQ, 68. 
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To recount quickly, the GE sketches were most likely written in 1934, before the 
letter to Keane and certainly prior to the composition of the Pantôn essay. We recall that 
Lonergan sent the letter to Keane on January 22, 1935; he wrote several drafts of the letter 
prior to January 22, 1935. Based on evidence found within the letter, the GE sketches were 
written prior to the first draft of the letter. In light of his shortage of time for personal study, it is 
highly unlikely that he composed the Pantôn essay prior to the sketches or prior to the letter 
to Keane and indeed, this is confirmed in the Pantôn essay itself in which Lonergan provides 
a quote from Donoso Cortes cited by Erich Przywara in Stimmen der Zeit (April, 1935).43 All 
the evidence, then, points to a composition of the notes prior to the composition of the letter 
to Keane.  
Next, we will establish an argument that dates the GE sketches as a slice of 
development between the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” and the Pantôn essay. Shute and 
Mathews both place the composition of the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” after Lonergan 
completed his course work in the spring of 1934. Lonergan completed a course in Church 
history on March 9, 1934 and the content of the course reflected much of the content of the 
essay.44 The GE sketches contain a clear reference to the notion of the dialectic of history, 
which was the subject of the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology.” Lonergan’s review of Keeler’s 
book was published in 1935.45 Lonergan’s notes on Kant and the GE sketches were likely 
composed around the same time and certainly after the composition of the “Essay in 
Fundamental Sociology.”  
We have established a probable time line that places the notes on Kant and the GE 
43 See OLNDH, 6, fn 17.  
44 OLNDH, 69, fn 21. 
45 Lonergan’s 1935 Review of L.W. Keeler’s “The Problem of Error, From Plato to Kant: A Historical and Critical 
Study” in Shorter Papers, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 20. (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2007), 131-35. 
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sketches between the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” and “Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis:” the 
order is likely as follows: “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” (Spring of 1934), Leo Keeler’s 
book review “The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant” (composed in 1934), Lonergan’s notes 
on Kant and the GE sketches, the Letter to the Reverend Father Provincial (January 22, 1935), 
and finally “Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis” (no earlier than April 1935).  
When placed between the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” and “Pantôn 
Anakephalaiôsis,” the GE sketches gain additional significance. Frederick Crowe argues that 
“Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis” is: “…of absorbing interest to those who would track Lonergan's 
development from its beginnings, through his Thomist studies, to Insight and the following thirty 
years; but quite apart from that historical interest the paper is intriguing in its own right as a 
study of human solidarity.”46 It is possible that Lonergan’s notes on Kant and the GE sketches 
for a general ethic in a Christian context helped shape his “Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis” essay that, 
as Frederick Crowe has argued, constitutes a sketch of the broad lines of the remainder of 
Lonergan’s career.47 
Now that we have placed the GE sketches as a moment of development between the 
“Essay in Fundamental Sociology” and “Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis,” I wish to shift our attention to 
some of the context surrounding their composition. To do this, I have created three categories. 
Firstly, I have compiled some biographical information on Lonergan in the early nineteen 
thirties. Secondly, I offer a reminder that Lonergan was studying in Rome during the politically 
uncertain years leading up to the war. Thirdly, I have compiled relevant information on 
Lonergan’s studies at the Gregorian University.     
46 PA, 135. 
47 Ibid. 
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Lonergan in 1935 
In hope of providing a more comprehensive understanding of the context of the GE 
sketches, I have compiled biographical research pertaining to Lonergan in the mid-nineteen 
thirties. To do this, I have relied heavily upon the work of Richard Liddy and William Matthews. 
As previously mentioned, Liddy has completed extensive research on this period in Lonergan’s 
life48 and Matthews has written a biography that includes important details of Lonergan’s life in 
the 1930’s.49 I have created several categories that I believe highlight important facets of 
Lonergan’s life in the mid-nineteen thirties, when the GE sketches were composed. 
In November 1933, Lonergan arrived in Rome as one of few Canadian students awarded 
the opportunity to study theology at the Gregorian University.50 Matthews provides details of 
Lonergan’s residency in Rome: 
He took up residence in a room with a view of the roofs of Rome, in the 
Bellarmino, a building steeped in Jesuit history and situated on the narrow via 
del Seminario. With his background in Roman history, he must have found the 
City fascinating. Turn right at the front door and walk for less than a minute 
and you are at the Forum. Continue across the decorative Piazza Navone and 
you are soon at St Peter’s and the Vatican. Turn left at the front door and almost 
immediately you are at the Church of St. Ignatius where, for the cost of a small 
coin, a spotlight lights up the words over the high altar, Romae Vobis Propitius 
Ego (I will be well disposed to you in Rome), words that Lonergan, as 
Ignatuis, felt were a good omen. Continue along the via del Seminario a short 
distance to the via del Corso, turn right, walk for about a minute and you 
are in the Piazza Venezia. There, from the balcony of the Palazza 
Venezia, Mussolini would address the crowds with his microphone.51  
Lonergan experienced the immanent beginning of the war. As I will detail in the next few 
48 Richard Liddy. Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan (Michael Glazier Books, 
1993). Referenced here after as: TL. 
49 LQ. 
50 LQ, 65.  
51 Ibid., 65-66. 
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sections of text, Lonergan’s time in Rome was difficult, but beneficial. Liddy describes 
Lonergan’s time in Rome as a “great boon” in his life.52 It was a period of development for 
Lonergan; the GE sketches provide a glimpse into this period of astounding growth.  
The war 
Lonergan arrived in Rome prior to the beginning of the war. He would have witnessed 
the years building up to the war. Matthew notes that: “Phillip Donnelley, a friend in Rome, 
recalled that he and Lonergan used to use code names when they talked about Hitler and 
Mussolini. According to Paul Shaugnessey, Donnelley said that he and Lonergan were just 
across the street from Hitler during one of his visits.”53 The GE sketches were composed in the 
midst of political uncertainty that eventually forced Lonergan to flee Rome.   
The Gregorian University 
The Gregorian University was under tremendous change during Lonergan’s stay. In 
1929, the university united with the Biblical and Oriental Institutes in Rome.54 The university 
staff expanded to over 300 and new faculties were added.55 Matthew notes that the expansion 
included a faculty of Church history that was influenced by Robert Lieber,56 an influential 
person in Lonergan’s first year of study.57 In 1931, the Vatican issued the Constitution, Deus 
Scientiarum Dominus (God, the Lord of the Sciences), in an attempt to locate “dogmatic 
theology within the context of the growth of positive and human sciences.”58 Lonergan was 
52 TL, 74. 
53 LQ, 66-67. 
54 Ibid., 67 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 73. 
58 Ibid., 67. 
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studying at the Gregorian University during a period of growth and reform. These changes 
introduced Lonergan to numerous theological approaches that influenced his understanding of 
the dialectic of history and helped shape Insight.  
Lonergan was influenced by a large variety of people at the Gregorian University, 
notably, Augustine, Henry Newman, Leo Keeler, Joseph Maréchal,59 and by courses taught by 
Bernard Leeming and Robert Lieber. In Insight Revisited we read:  
“It was through Stefanu ... that I learnt to speak of human knowledge as not 
intuitive but discursive with the decisive component in judgment. This view 
was confirmed by my familiarity with Augustine’s key notion, veritas, and the 
whole was rounded out by Bernard Leeming’s course on the Incarnate Word, 
which convinced me that there could not be a hypostatic union without a real 
distinction between essence and existence. This, of course was all the more 
acceptable, since Aquinas’ esse corresponded to Augustine’s veritas and both 
harmonised with Maréchal’s view of judgement.”60  
Prior to his departure for Rome, Lonergan spent the summer reading Augustine. Liddy 
writes: “Lonergan specified the works of Augustine that he read in the summer of 1933 as the 
ones written at Cassiciacum…These dialogues are the De Beata Vita (The Happy Life), Contra 
Academicos (Answer to Skeptics), the De Ordine (Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil), 
and the Soliloquiae (The Soliloquies).”61 Augustine influenced Lonergan’s shift from 
nominalism.62 His reading of Augustine created an intellectual conviction that influenced him to 
write an essay on the nature of the act of faith. He gave the essay to Fr. Henry Smeaton.63  
Shortly after his arrival in Rome, Lonergan composed a 30,000 word essay on 
59 TL, 101. 
60 “Insight Revisited” in A Second Collection. Edited by William F.J. Ryan and Bernard Tyrrell. (London: Darton, 
Longman & Todd, 1974), 265. 
61 Ibid. 50. 
62 Ibid. 41. 
63 Ibid. 75. 
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Newman.64 He was clearly influenced by Newman’s work.65 Lonergan wrote: “My fundamental 
mentor and guide has been John Henry Newman's Grammar of Assent. I read that in my third 
year philosophy (at least the analytic parts) about five times and found solutions for my 
problems. I was not at all satisfied with the philosophy that was being taught and found 
Newman's presentation to be something that fitted in with the way I knew things. It was from 
that kernel that I went on to different authors.”66 Lonergan gave his 30,000 word essay to Leo 
Keeler, who must have been impressed by it, because a short time later, Keeler asked Lonergan 
to review his book “Problem of Error from Plato to Kant.”67 I believe that this review led 
Lonergan to a serious consideration of Kant. As Frederick Crowe’s analysis suggests, at this 
point in his development, Lonergan favored Plato’s position on knowledge over Kant’s.68 
Richard Liddy has examined Lonergan’s review and argues that the text provides valuable 
perspective into Lonergan’s thoughts on the relationship between materialism, realism, and 
idealism that he later takes up in Insight.69 Keeler also deals with a portion of text from Hume 
that details Hume’s position on perception. Hume concludes that causes cannot be seen. It is this 
conclusion that causes Lonergan to ask: “what exactly does understanding apprehend?”70 
Answering this, according to Mathews, was key motivation for writing Insight.71 
Liddy and Matthews provide glimpses of Lonergan’s study schedule in Rome. In a letter 
sent to Henry Smeaton on May 9 1934, Lonergan recounts his experience of the year, describing 
64 BLFK, 4. 
65 TL, 39 and 76.  
66 Bernard Lonergan. “Reality, Myth, Symbol,” in Alan M. Olson (ed.) Myth, Symbol, Reality (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), 32-33.  
67 BLFK, 4.  
68 Developing the Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes, 34 n.49 and page 13 of 
fragments.  
69 TL, 76-84. 
70 LQ, 69-70. 
71 Ibid., 70.  
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his view of the rooftops, the noise of the traffic, and the villa Borghese.72 In the letter, we also 
see glimpses of Lonergan’s busy schedule in Rome. As already established, he had little time for 
personal study.73 He faced morning lectures and lectures immediately after his evening meal.74 
In his first year of study, Lonergan took a course on Church history taught by Robert Lieber, a 
relatively new face at the Gregorian University. Liddy notes that “during his theological courses 
in Rome one part of his Church history course dealt with political questions such as the relation 
of the Church to revolution, liberalism, nationalism, socialism and Bolshevism. It also dealt with 
the Church in America, Latin America, and Asia. Mathews notes that, “this seems to have been 
one of the few courses in Rome for which Lonergan kept his lecture notes, an interesting 
indicator of personal interest.”75  
Lonergan decided to study German after his first year of studies in Rome. He spent his 
summer in the villa of the German College in Rome. Matthews notes that Lonergan believed 
there were good ideas among the Germans.76 He held a high opinion of Lennerz, a German 
theologian.77 Texts by Lennerz were an important feature of Lonergan’s second year studies.78 
In Lonergan’s second year, courses focused on God as a unity and a trinity. These 
courses consulted Volume 1 of the Summa and two works by Lennerz: De Deo Uno, and De 
Novissimis.79 During Lonergan’s second year, Lennerz taught him a course on grace and the 
theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity.80 In that same year, “Filograssi introduced him to 
the classical theology of the Trinity, which he himself would teach in his years as a professor in 
72 Ibid., 68. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., 69. 
75 TL, 85. 
76 LQ, 69. 
 77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., 84. 
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Toronto and later in Rome. The course was structured around theses on the processions of a 
Word and of Love in God, and on the relations defining the Divine persons and missions.”81 
Lonergan also took a course on Creation and Redemption at this time.82 In his third year, he took 
the course on the Incarnate World from Leeming.83 Lonergan went on to teach these same 
courses in Toronto and Rome.84  It is clear that Lonergan’s time in Rome was a period of great 
development for him, development that shaped the remainder of his career and the GE sketches 
offer a rare glimpse into this period of development.  
Now that we have established their significance, dated them, and explored some of the 
context surrounding their composition, we turn attention to the sketches themselves. In the 
following chapter I have provided an annotated and transcribed version of the hand written GE 
sketches. In the subsequent two chapters, I explore their content and ordering. In the final chapter 
I highlight connections between them and chapter 18 of Insight. For now, we turn attention to the 
sketches themselves.  
81 Ibid., 69. 
82 Ibid., 75. 
83 TL, 114. 
84 LQ, 82-83. 
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Chapter 2: Annotated Trans criptions 
In the context of functional specialization, “research makes available the data relevant to 
… [the] investigation.”85 My primary aim in this chapter is to introduce a transcription of 
Lonergan’s hand-written sketches on the Metaphysics of Customs. The GE sketches were 
originally transcribed by Robert Doran.86 I have attached copies of the archival files for the GE 
sketches (File A13) and Lonergan’s notes on Kant (File A12) in the appendix at the end of this 
project.  
 I have made some changes and additions to Doran's work to provide a more accurate 
presentation of the text as originally written by Lonergan. The most significant changes deal with 
formatting, I rearranged Doran’s transcription to match the format of Lonergan’s original 
sketches. I found aligning the format of the transcription materially helpful in the initial stages of 
developing an interpretation of the meaning of the text. Lonergan himself notes “There are 
three basic exegetical stages: (1) understand the text: (2) judging how correct one’s understanding 
of the text is; and (3) stating what one judges to be the correct understanding of the text.”87 In this 
chapter I am primarily concerned with the basic research of preparing the text to be understood.  
To this end, I have restored Lonergan’s use of biblical Greek, as it appears in the 
handwritten GE sketches. I wanted the transcription of the text to be as accurate to the original 
text as possible. In a few places, which I note, the original text itself is unclear and, in these 
cases, I have relied on Doran’s transcription. A few additional corrections were made to the 
Doran transcription: arrows present within the original text were restored to the transcription,88 I 
85 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972), 127. 
86 Robert Doran’s transcription of the 13000DTE030/A13 file, available online from the Lonergan Archive. File 
1300ADTE030/A13.   
87 Method in Theology, 155. 
88 See footnotes 10, 18, 20, 43, 55, 80, and 81.  
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corrected errors made when transcribing page one and three of the original text,89 and I restored 
the text from the left hand margin of page three,90 of the original hand written sketches, to the 
transcribed document. 
Using the minimally-edited version of Doran’s transcription, I provide some initial 
helpful notes to aid the task of interpreting the GE sketches. As they have yet to receive any 
detailed inspection within the community of scholars, it is my hope that this project will generate 
further interest in the GE sketches and also in the related “History File”91 from the same period.  
89 See footnotes 23, 57 and 65.  
90 “Hamlet’s Soliloquies” see footnote 67.  
91 For reference to the so-called “History File” (File 713), see: Michael Shute, OLNDH, 67-71. 
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Transcription and Annotations  
[Page One] 
  General Ethic92  [Metaphysics of Customs.]93 
1. Origin of philosophy - Buddhism, Confucius, Platonism and Neo-Platonism
Philosophy94 as a way of life: Augustine amor sapientiae95  
Reflective character of philosophy – life, an object of reflection 
2. Spontaneous notion of happiness.    96ideal of imagination
α. 1 Solon and Croesus97 
  2 health, wealth, friends, position, security, occupation, some  
  religion to give resignation to death. 
  3 Aristotle puts happiness in occupation (ἐνέργεια)98 and  
  faces death as a matter of course. Does not99 try to solve riddle 
100 4. Greatest happiness of the101 greatest number – Bentham and Utilitarians 
       Well-being and advanced of humanity. 
  5 Bolshevism: answer of proletariat - a a more equal distribution 
   b philosophic system [godless, good = Soviet] 
 ↘102 
  materialist.103 
        104 ↙ Human wisdom brought to support Divine Law. 
3 Ecclesiastes.   Pass your days in simplicity (ενεργεια)105 
   God’s governance and ultimate judgement taken for granted.106 
92 I have added the line under the heading “General Ethic” and have restored a large amount of space between 
“General Ethic” and “[Metaphysics of Customs]” to coincide with Lonergan’s original text. 
93 “.” Is an addition to Doran’s text.  
94 Here Lonergan has drawn an arrow pointing to “Buddhism” in the previous line.  
95 Underlining of “amor sapientiae” added.  
   “amor sapientiae” is translated as: “love of wisdom”. For a detailed explanation see: Philip Burton. Language in 
the Confessions of Augustine (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 80.  
96 Space added 
97 I have changed Doran’s use of “a” to “α.”  
98 Restoration of Greek used in original notes.  
99 The text is unclear, but Robert Doran suggests “not” 
100 “.” Added after “4” 
101 Text is unclear 
102 Arrow added.   
103 “.” added.  
104 Arrow added. 
105 Restoration of Greek used in original notes. 
106 “.” added. 
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  What does life give? 48 222 39 514,15 Vanity of Vanities 107 108 
        cf Kant – impossibility of systematic attainment of happiness [counsel not precept] 
  ενεργεια109– 322   517   94-10 110 
  Incomprehensibility of life 817 cf. 41-3 92,3,11,12 105-7  111 
107 I have corrected the format of biblical references to align with the original notes. I have also corrected a mistake 
made in Doran’s transcription of the file. Doran uses: “48, 222, 31, 514, 15” but I believe the file reads: “48, 222, 39, 
514,15”. The text is a little bit unclear, but when compared with its corresponding reference in the second sketch, it 
becomes clear that Ecc. 39 was the intended reference. See: sketch 2 section 2 (page 3 of the original notes).  
108 The verses referenced in this line are as follows:  
Ecc. 48 one person who has no other, either son or brother, yet there is no end to all his toil, and his eyes are never 
satisfied with riches, so that he never asks, “For whom am I toiling and depriving myself of pleasure?” This also is 
vanity and an unhappy business. Ecc. 222 What has a man from all the toil and striving of heart with which he toils 
beneath the sun? Ecc.39What gain has the worker from his toil? Ecc. 514 and those riches were lost in a bad 
venture. And he is father of a son, but he has nothing in his hand. Ecc. 515 As he came from his mother's womb he 
shall go again, naked as he came, and shall take nothing for his toil that he may carry away in his hand. (ESV) 
109 Restoration of Greek used in original notes.  
110 Format of biblical references corrected. 
The verses referenced in this line are as follows:  
Ecc.322 So I saw that there is nothing better than that a man should rejoice in his work, for that is his lot. Who can 
bring him to see what will be after him? 
Ecc. 517 Moreover, all his days he eats in darkness in much vexation and sickness and anger. 
Ecc. 9 4 But he who is joined with all the living has hope, for a living dog is better than a dead lion. 5 For the living 
know that they will die, but the dead know nothing, and they have no more reward, for the memory of them is 
forgotten. 6 Their love and their hate and their envy have already perished, and forever they have no more share in 
all that is done under the sun.7 Go, eat your bread with joy, and drink your wine with a merry heart, for God has 
already approved what you do. 8 Let your garments be always white. Let not oil be lacking on your head. 9 Enjoy life 
with the wife whom you love, all the days of your vain life that he has given you under the sun, because that is 
your portion in life and in your toil at which you toil under the sun. 10 Whatever your hand finds to do, do it with 
your might, for there is no work or thought or knowledge or wisdom in Sheol, to which you are going. (ESV) 
111 Format of biblical references corrected.  
Ecc. 817 then I saw all the work of God, that man cannot find out the work that is done under the sun. However 
much man may toil in seeking, he will not find it out. Even though a wise man claims to know, he cannot find it out. 
cf: Ecc. 41Again I saw all the oppressions that are done under the sun. And behold, the tears of the oppressed, and 
they had no one to comfort them! On the side of their oppressors there was power, and there was no one to 
comfort them. 2 And I thought the dead who are already dead more fortunate than the living who are still alive. 
3 But better than both is he who has not yet been and has not seen the evil deeds that are done under the sun. 
Ecc. 92 It is the same for all, since the same event happens to the righteous and the wicked, to the good and the 
evil, to the clean and the unclean, to him who sacrifices and him who does not sacrifice. As the good one is, so is 
the sinner, and he who swears is as he who shuns an oath. 3 This is an evil in all that is done under the sun,that the 
same event happens to all. Also, the hearts of the children of man are full of evil, and madness is in their hearts 
while they live, and after that they go to the dead.  Ecc. 911 Again I saw that under the sun the race is not to the 
swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the intelligent, nor favor to those with 
knowledge, but time and chance happen to them all. 12 For man does not know his time. Like fish that are taken in 
an evil net, and like birds that are caught in a snare, so the children of man are snared at an evil time, when it 
suddenly falls upon them. 
Ecc. 10 5 There is an evil that I have seen under the sun, as it were an error proceeding from the ruler: 6 folly is set 
in many high places, and the rich sit in a low place. 7 I have seen slaves on horses, and princes walking on the 
ground like slaves. (ESV) 
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 112cf. Socrates    o αuτος  λογος “why, I do not know”113 
         1211 words of wise man are as goads114 
 vanity of achievement 21-11 of wisdom 211-26 68  115
   of life in general [fleeting etc. passim.116 
4. Buddha – desire an illusion ∴ escape to x117
Plato      – assertion of moral law -
  negates spontaneous idea (Gorgias) - absolute. 
  Republic as critique of society 
5. Moral Theory – Stoic Logos ‘Sequi naturam, rationem” 118
  Augustine – lex aeterna 
  Scholastics – juridical development. 
 [do not forget “sentiment, analysis of virtue]119 
6. Progress of philosophy according to St. Thomas – more to less general
   Kant’s greater precision 
   Examination of Kant 
7 Dynamic [amor sapientiae] as well as more precise foundation of ethic. 
  The human act – material, formal, efficient cause. 
   Finality – Good-True or Impulse (Nature of (Will, Obligation, Freedom)120    
Rationalization          (Kant’s natural dialectic) 
[Page 2] 
Man as instrument _ a potency, external mover121 
  c prearranged by God 
  b Man’s choice – Reason or Impulse.122 
112 “.” added after “cf” 
113 Original Greek restored and underlining of “why” added.  114 Format 
of biblical reference corrected in this line.  
115 Format of biblical references corrected. 
116 Removed “]” and added underlining to “passim” 
117 Corrected Doran’s use of “…” to the symbol “∴” 
118 Closing quotation mark added to align with original notes. 
119 Opening quotation mark added (as it appears in the original text).
120 Underlining added. 
121 Corrected “-“ to “_”. 
122 “.” added. 
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          d Social effect.123 
Faith and supernatural act – Transcendent Reason.124 
Dialectics of History - nature, sin, supernature. 
  State tends to be rallying point for lower tendency. 
  Christianity – solution of the dialectic – Faith (Dogma, Confession) – Charity - 
Action   - as moral – absolute value 
- as ἐνέργεια – the days of my life, shall we remember them?125
- as effective – Living is giving.126 [Reason treats all men as equal to self.]
overlooked by Kant↑127 
   1 Economic division of Labour128 
   2 Family 
   3 Science, art, Research and teaching 
   4 giving morally – estote imitators mei129 
Virtues    Wisdom – Truth known and loved 
  Justice –   Equality of all before intellect 
 Matter of Law in all.130 
   Social Justice – effecting conditions that make 
  justice possible 
 Temperance and fortitude – re execution 
 Prudence – re application of wisdom to ἄπειρον131 
   Faith – transcendent intelligence 
   Hope – the goodness of the transcendent intelligence – Our Father 
  Charity – the beauty of transcendent Wisdom – the Ideal – the  
 vision splendid  oro fiat illud quod jam sitio 
  ut te revelata cernens facie  
  visu sim beatus tuae gloriae 
Motivation: Main thing is to observe the law; man is body and soul132 
123 Underlining added. 
124 Underlining added. 
125 Restoration of Greek used in original notes. 
126 Underlining added. 
127 Arrow added.  
128 I have changed “labour” to “Labour”. 
129 Underlining added. 
130 Underlining added. 
131 Restoration of Greek used in original notes. 
132 Underlining added.  
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  Serviam mente, serviam et corpori  
  Pedagogic character of Xtian motivation. 
1. Heaven and Hell133
α  as reward or punishment: presupposes faith134
β  as love of God - an exact idea of God’s rights on instrument135
2. Reason – instrument136
3. Gratitude - goodness of creation137
 qui eripuit nos de potestate tenebrarum 
  church: doctrine, hierarchy and counsels, sacraments 
4. Achievement: Adveniat regnum tuum: estote imitators mei138
   overlooked by Kant↑    ↘139 
         Zeal for souls - spark that leaps from example. 
   Xt: way, truth, life: supernatural: above our deserts 
Spiritual life: supernaturalised man – what and how of every instant140 
   spontaneity of no account – replaced by other 
        union with God – an intellectual orientation 
wisdom and power of God -  love of cross – we can do so little – we have so short a time.141 
 Excessive disregard of human element is seed of spark142 
133 “.” after “1” added. 
134 Underlining added. 
135Underlining added.  
136 “.” after “2” added. 
137 “.” after “3” added. 
138 “.” after “4” added. 
139 Arrows added. 
140 Underlining added.  
141 I have rearranged the text, Doran uses: “love of Cross - wisdom and power of God” but the original text is 
“wisdom and power of God - love of cross”. 
142 Underlining added. 
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[Page 3]  
General Ethic    [Metaphysic of Customs] 
1. Happiness as an ideal of the imagination
  ἀνήρ σαρκικός143  Economic man. 
  Naïve realism.   Reason a means for the satisfaction 
  of impulse, desire.  
  Social systems: |Greatest happiness of greatest number. Bentham 
  |Bolshevism: state the means for this goal. 144 
 A possible interpretation of Nicomachean Ethic. 
 Arist. puts the end in the activity – ἐνέργεια145  
 subordinates the external as a means to end 
 a humanly necessary means [competence, position, friends.]146 
2. Negation of foregoing.
  Buddha: desire an illusion, happiness an escape to ? 
  Ecclesiastes: vanity of achievement 21-11        | Reflection 48  
  wisdom        212-26 68  |  147 
148Ecc. 222 ‘For what profit shall a man have of all his labour and 
  vexation of spirit, with which he hath been tormented under 
  the sun?’ cf149 39 514,15  
  cf. Kant     Impossibility of systematic and infallible plan for  
  attaining an empirical end. 
 322 “And I have found that nothing is better than for a 
 man to rejoice in his work: and that this is his portion.” 
        cf Aristotle   ἐνέργεια150   cf 517, 94-10 
151 | 41-3 “..I saw the oppressions that are done under the sun, and 
143 Restoration of Greek used in original notes. 
144 Where I have drawn the two lines, Lonergan has drawn a large parenthesis joining “Greatest happiness of 
greatest number. Bentham” and “Bolshevism: state the means for this goal”. 
145 Restoration of Greek used in original notes. 
146 “.” added. 
147 Format of biblical references has been corrected in this section. Where I have drawn the two lines, Lonergan 
has drawn one solid line with “Reflection 48” written on the right side of the line, directly between the two verses 
written on the left of the line.   
148 All biblical references in this section have been corrected. 
149 Doran’s transcription used “9.39 5.14, 15” which I have corrected to “cf 39 515,14” because Ecc. 9.39 is non-
existent. The mistaken “9” looks very similar to the continual use of “cf”.  
150 Restoration of Greek used in original notes. 
151 Where I have drawn the perforated line, Lonergan has vertically written and underlined “Hamlet’s soliloquies” 
between the margin of the page and the body of the text. Not included in Doran’s transcription. 
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  |   the tears of the innocent. And they had no comforter: and they 
  |   were not able to resist their violence, being destitute of help  
  |   from any. 2And I praised the dead rather than the living.  
  |  3And I judged him happier than them both that is not yet  
  |   born, nor hath seen the evils that are done under the sun.  
  49-12 Friendship.152 
  817 Incomprehensibility of life   “And I understood that man can  
   find no reason of all those works of God that are done 
   under the sun: and the more he shall labour to seek,  
   so much the less shall he find; yea, though the wise  
   man shall say that he knoweth it, he shall not be able 
   to find it.” cf. 92, 3, 11, 12. 105-7 
 cf. Socrates ὁ αὐτός  λόγος:153 why, I do not know 
    1211 “the words of the wise man are as goads”154 Socrates155 gad-fly. 
N.B. God’s governance taken for granted throughout and universal judgement. 
[Page 4] 
 ἀνήρ ψυχικὸς156 
3. Assertion of Morality157  [Gorgias] Plato’s Socrates.158
   α Negation of ideal of imagination re pleasure and pain 
        β affirmation of the good – at any cost. 
   Social aspect – Republic – impotence 
4. Development of Morality – Stoicism159
 Objective λόγος160–   sequi naturam   ie. rationem 
 social impotence 
-philosophy, a way of life
152 Ecc. 49 Two are better than one, because they have a good reward for their toil. 10 For if they fall, one will lift up 
his fellow. But woe to him who is alone when he falls and has not another to lift him up! 11 Again, if two lie 
together, they keep warm, but how can one keep warm alone? 12 And though a man might prevail against one who 
is alone, two will withstand him—a threefold cord is not quickly broken. (ESV) 
153 Restoration of Greek used in original notes. 
154 Quotation marks added.  
155 Text unclear.  
156 Restoration of Greek used in original notes. I have placed the word above “Plato’s Socrates” as it appears in the 
original notes.  
157 “:” removed.  
158 “.” after “3” added. 
159 “.” after “4” added. 
160 Restoration of Greek used in original notes. 
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5. Augustine  :  α Beata vita.161
  β Idea of development - amore coelestium expugnatur amor terrestris162 
  γ  lex aeterna.163 
 ↘ 164 
   Scholasticism 
[RD: an arrow is drawn from Stoicism in 4 to development in 5, with “philosophy, a way of life” 
written between]165 
6 Examination of Kant 
7 Scholastic System – Rights and duties 
ἀνήρ πνευματικός166 
   Giving a local habitation and a name to the dictate of reason of the 
   scholastic - presenting ethics not juridically but dynamically. 
 Analysis of action, nature of freedom 
 Man an instrument. 
 Dialectics of history – state tends to be rallying point for lower tendency 
 Action   as ενεργεια167– occupation [indifference]  {economic scientific}168 
 as moral – absolute value   { division of labour 
 as effective – living is giving      {in family 
 κατ' εξοχήν169 – giving morally.170 
 estote imitators mei. 
161 “.” after “5” added. Underlining of “Augustine” and “α” added. 
162 Underlining added. 
163 Underlining added.  
164 Arrow added.  
165 See: Robert Doran’s transcription of the 13000DTE030/A13 file, available online from the Lonergan Archive. File 
1300ADTE030/A13, 5.  
166 Restoration of Greek used in original notes. 
167 Restoration of Greek used in original notes. 
168 Parenthesis added.  
169 Restoration of Greek used in original notes. 
170 Underlining and “.” added. 
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[Page 5] 
Happiness171 
Impulse: ideal of the imagination – anticipation greater than 
  event (am I enjoying myself) - cf. Kant (no possibility of system)172 
  Needed a bit of reflectiveness: one can simply drift without asking 
 questions. Reflection: life is passing; what am I getting  
 out of it. No doubt about desire, yearning, passion, but 
 where is it all leading. 
  Aristotle:173 in an ἐνέργεια,174 some form of activity 
 not in possessing something outside of self 
        but in being active in a satisfying way 
 α175 Activity of το θειοτατον νοῦς176 
 β177 Activity of moral virtues 
 γ178  Mass of men: fear of punishment, hope of rewards 
  Buddha :    desire is an illusion – away with desire.179 
  Plato      :    the good :  at any cost. (Gorgias)180 
171 Double underlining added. 
172 Broken underline added, as it appears in original text. 
173 Underlining added. 
174 Restoration of Greek used in original notes.  
175 Underlining added. 
176 Restoration of Greek used in original notes.  
177 Underlining added. 
178 Underlining added. 
179 “.” added. 
180 Underlining added. 
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Chapter Three: Research Notes on the First Sketch 
We have provided some context for the GE sketches, have established their significance, 
and have seen a transcribed version of the original sketches. We now turn our attention to 
sketches themselves. In this chapter, I provided some initial research notes on the first two pages 
of the sketches, which I will later argue constitutes the first sketch. In the following chapter, I 
will compare the second and third sketches with the first sketch. It is my hope that this initial 
research will aid in the future interpretation of the GE sketches. Let us now turn our attention to 
the first sketch.  
Initial Research Notes 
As Robert Doran suggests, it is apparent that in the GE sketches, Lonergan attempts to 
work out his own metaphysic of ethics on the basis of a reflection on the Kantian ethic 
summarized in File A12.181 File A12, we will recall, contains Lonergan’s notes on Kant’s 
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten which he read in Giacommo Pisticonne’s Italian 
translation Fondamenti della Metapysica des Costumi. Lonergan’s use of the phrase ‘Metaphysic 
of Custom’ establishes the link between his reflections on the Italian translation of Kant’s work 
and the GE sketches. In addition, it was around this same time that Lonergan was writing a 
review of L.W. Keeler’s The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant: A Historical and Critical 
Study.182  All three sets of notes were found in the same archival folder.183 Also, as Doran notes, 
the GE sketches and Lonergan’s notes on Kant’s Fondamenti della Metapysica des Costumi 
181 From Robert Doran’s notes on the transcription of the 13000DTE030/A13 file, available online from the 
Lonergan Archive. File 1300ADTE030/A13. http://www.bernardlonergan.com/archiveitem.php?id=145  
182 Bernard Lonergan, Review of L.W. Keeler, S.J., The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant: A Historical and 
Critical Study in Shorter Papers Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 20 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2007), 133-140. 
183 See: OLNDH.  
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were written on the same style of paper.184 
Richard Liddy offers insight into Lonergan’s concern with Kant: 
Kant suffered from the obsession that the only possible justification was 
some sort of spiritual apprehension of the thing- in- itself - a presentation and not 
a mere understanding of the object. Since such a presentation was not to be 
had…Kant decided that there could be no theoretical justification for 
the demand to understand. Metaphysics had to go by the boards; we have 
no right to understand; all that we have is a practical need of understanding, 
so as to be able to carry on the dull business of daily life.185  
In other words, Lonergan viewed Kant’s basic error as similar to the naïve realism of the 
scholastics: an understanding of understanding as some kind of “spiritual apprehension of the 
‘thing-in-itself.’”186 The GE sketches relate to Lonergan’s problem with Kant. It highlights the 
Kantian error by revealing Lonergan’s own alternative approach to the problem of grounding a 
general ethic. 
I believe that GE sketches mark an important moment in Lonergan’s development. 
They are, of course, a response to issues raised by his reading of Kant’s Fondamenti della 
Metapysica des Costumi. Given Kant’s importance in the development of modern ethical 
philosophy, this makes the GE sketches, if correct, significant. But of even greater interest to 
Lonergan scholars is the degree to which the GE sketches are an initial outline of core elements 
toward Lonergan’s own version of a groundwork for a metaphysics of ethics. In this respect, the 
GE sketches provide a glimpse of the origins of Chapter 18 in Insight, just as his History File 
(File 713) provides us with the earliest sketches for the elements of chapters 6, 7 and 20 of 
Insight.187 The GE sketches are clearly concerned with ethics. They explore two main questions: 
184 DT, 1.  
185 TL, 78. 
186 Ibid. 
187 See: OLNDH, 67-111. 
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“what is happiness?” and “what constitutes a happy life?” There is a direct link between 
“what to do?” questions, which are directly concerned with ethical decisions, and happiness. 
In a reflection on Aristotle, Brian Cronin writes:  
Aristotle's approach to ethics is called 'eudaemonist', meaning orientated towards 
happiness, determined by the end of seeking for happiness…The happiness that 
Aristotle is talking about is a total self-transcending self-fulfillment of every 
aspect of the person; it is not to be confused with the happiness of modern usage, 
which is often the same as pleasure.188  
The GE sketches appear to be, at least in part, an attempt at figuring out what choices constitute a 
happy life. At the least, they provide a context for understanding the quest for happiness as it is 
relevant for a metatheory of ethics.  
The GE sketches appear to be two outlines for a project or a book on Ethics and an 
additional summary sketch on happiness, which I will discuss at length in the next chapter. I am 
however, working from this assumption throughout the remainder of this chapter. The point-form 
structure of the GE sketches provides some grounds for this assumption. In any case, operating 
under this assumption does not fundamentally interfere with how we interpret the text. 
Regardless of their intended purpose, the context of the GE sketches and their order of 
presentation are significant data for understanding Lonergan’s line of thought and are especially 
relevant for understanding elements of his early development that eventually lead him to chapter 
18 of Insight. 
188 Brian Cronin. Value Ethics: A Lonergan Perspective (Kenya: Consolata Institute of Philosophy Press, 2006), 44. 
34 
Research: Page One 
Having now considered a few initial research notes, we turn our attention to the text 
itself. Page one of the handwritten GE sketches is divided into seven sections: 1) Origin of 
philosophy, 2) Spontaneous notion of happiness, 3) Ecclesiastes, 4) Buddha/Plato, 5) Moral 
Theology, 6) Progress of Philosophy (Aquinas and Kant), and 7) Dynamic [amor sapientiae] as 
well as more precise foundation of ethic. I will address each section individually and show how 
the sections relate to one another. It is important to note that a division of pages within the 
sketches does not constitute a division of thought; sections from page one relate directly to 
sections from page two in sub-sequential order. In the following chapter, I will address the 
second and third set of sketches, but for now, we focus on the first sketch. 
Section One - Origin of philosophy 
         In the first section, Lonergan appears to be considering the origin of philosophy in 
Buddhism, Confucius, Platonism, and Neo-Platonism. It is interesting that he takes such a 
general approach and that he considers more than just Western texts. Lonergan is using what we 
would now call a world-religions context. In the second line, he notes that philosophy is a way 
of life and directly relates it to Buddhism with an arrow. He also links it to Augustine’s amor 
sapientiae (love for wisdom).189 The link between philosophy as a way of life and Buddhism is 
perhaps self-evident. Much debate surrounds the question of whether Buddhism is a way of life or 
a philosophy; when considering “philosophy as a way of life,” Buddhism appears to fit both 
categories. Nancy Ross offers a discussion of Buddhism’s dual nature.190 Augustine, in his auto-
biography 
189 Philip Burton. Language in the Confessions of Augustine (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 80-81. 
190 Nancy Wilson Ross. Buddhism, a Way of Life and Thought (New York: Random House Inc., 1981).   
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Confessions,191 tracks the process in which a self-reflective life is fueled by amor sapientiae. The 
text highlights Augustine’s efforts to understand philosophy as a way of life.192  
The final line of section one deals with the reflective character of philosophy. Lonergan 
links this directly to life as an object of reflection. His argument appears to be that philosophy is 
a way of life and life is an object of reflection, therefore philosophy has a reflective character. It 
seems fair to argue that under these assumptions, Lonergan, as well, understands philosophy is 
reflection on life. One may hypothesize that Lonergan believed Buddhism, Confucius, 
Platonism, and Neo-Platonism were examples of philosophy as a reflection on life and a way of 
life, but this is not explicitly stated here. The reason why Lonergan has included these particular 
four touchstones is unclear. It is possible that the sketches are a sketch for a book; if that is the 
case, Lonergan may have intended to use these four examples in the first chapter of the book. Of 
interest here is that in his “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” from 1934 we also find a reference 
to the Buddha which is quite suggestive in the present context. 
Gotama would have been as great a dialectician as Socrates had he lived in 
Athens. But he lived where men had not the habit of demanding the reason 
why for everything, of listening to orators and appraising their arguments, of 
following the sophists to learn to be orators themselves. This social fact 
differentiated Socrates from all the wise and profound men who preceded him. 
It was the birth of philosophy, of following reason like the breeze, blow where 
it will. It was the promise of the eternal search for the reasons for everything 
up to the ultimum cur.193 
It is also possible that Lonergan intended to establish a foundation that connected philosophy, 
history, and religion. The “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” is, among other things, a 
presentation of a theory of the dialectic of history that explicitly identifies links between 
191 Augustine. Confessions (trans. Henry Chadwick) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
192 Language in the Confessions of Augustine, 80. 
193 EFS, 24. 
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Catholicism and philosophy.194 Indeed, Lonergan makes the bold claim that "Christianity was at 
once a symbol and a trans-philosophical higher control.”195 
Section Two – Spontaneous notion of happiness 
The second section deals with the spontaneous notion of happiness as an ideal of imagination. It is 
not clear what Lonergan means when he uses the word spontaneous, but it reads as if he means naturally 
occurring, a trend that we also see throughout Insight. Lonergan appears to be starting a list in this section, he 
begins by using the Greek symbol “ α” but fails to include sub-sequential lettering. He includes a l ist of one 
through five following the “α” symbol that appear to be five distinct notions of happiness. Lonergan’s 
notes on K ant refer to the quest for happiness: “Again, what is happiness?”196 Over the next few sections  
of text, we will see Lonergan refute the spontaneous notion of happiness, much like Kant does: 
"p38 Perfect argument against any attempt to define happiness in concrete - not riches,
property, long life, health.”197  
The first of the five divisions refers to Solon and Croesus, a story recounted by 
Herodotus.198 To recount quickly, it is the story of a 6th century BCE king named Croesus who 
lived in Lydia. The king, although extremely rich, constantly sought the affirmation of other 
people. He wanted affirmation that he was the richest and happiest man alive. The wisest man 
in Greece, Solon, came to visit Croesus and was asked to confirm the name of the happiest 
person in Greece. Solon gave two responses, neither of which were Croesus. Solon told the 
outraged Croesus: “I see that thou art wonderfully rich, and art the lord of many nations; but 
with respect to that whereon thou questionest me, I have no answer to give, until I hear that thou 
hast closed 
194 OLNDH, 69-70. 
195 LEER, 28.  
196 KN, 6. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Herodotus. The Histories. (trans. Robin Waterfield) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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thy life happily. For assuredly he who possesses great store of riches is no nearer happiness than 
he who has what suffices for his daily needs, unless it so hap that luck attend upon him, and so 
he continues in the enjoyment of all his good things to the end of life. For many of the wealthiest 
men have been unfavoured of fortune, and many whose means were moderate have had excellent 
luck.”199 Later in life, Croesus faced misfortune and realized the truth in Solon’s statement. The 
story is an illustration of the difference between the internal state of happiness and the passing 
emotion of happiness, it also places the judgement of happiness in death. Furthermore, the story 
relates to Aristotle’s understanding of happiness, as Brian Cronin has discussed:  
Aristotle's approach to ethics is called 'eudaemonist', meaning orientated 
towards happiness, determined by the end of seeking for happiness. His ethics 
is also called teleological, meaning operating in terms of a final end. Aristotle 
clearly thinks of man becoming. His basic metaphysical categories are potency 
and act. He sees humans as developing from potentiality to actuality, childhood 
to adulthood and changing all through life. We are not born actually virtuous; 
we are born with a potentiality to become virtuous or vicious. He realizes that 
the main categories to be dealt with in this struggle to become a good human 
person are happiness and pleasure. Happiness by definition is the final end of 
man. It is that which is chosen for its own sake and for the sake of which 
everything else is chosen. It is never a means but always an end; it seems to be 
both a subtle feeling and a state of mind.200 
The second spontaneous notion of happiness lists materialistic things that potentially 
generate happiness: “health, wealth, friends, position, security, occupation, some religion to give 
resignation to death.”201 The third spontaneous notion references Aristotle’s placement of 
happiness in occupation (ἐνέργεια). Stephan Herzberg suggests that the word ἐνέργεια should be 
199 Herodotus. The Histories. The quotation used is available online from Fordham University: 
http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/ancient/herodotus-creususandsolon.asp  
200 Value Ethics: A Lonergan Perspective, 44. 
201 GE notes, 1.  
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translated as a life mode of actuality or activity.202 In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle wrote: 
“for as it is not one swallow or one fine day that makes a spring, so it is not one day or a short 
time that makes a man blessed and happy.”203 For Aristotle, happiness is not measured by single 
moments or acts. 
Lonergan notes that Aristotle does not try to solve a riddle, but is unclear about which 
riddle he is referring to. I propose that the riddle could be in reference to the Solon and Croesus 
story: am I happy? What does it mean to be happy? But I also note that in the “Essay in 
Fundamental Sociology” Lonergan notes: “the only science of Ethics that Aristotle would 
attempt was a practical ethics that neatly dodged the real questions about the ultimate of 
society.”204 
The fourth spontaneous notion deals with the Utilitarian doctrine and Jeremy Bentham’s 
greatest happiness principle. Jeremy Bentham invoked a “fundamental axiom, it is the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong.”205 Bentham directly 
relates happiness, understood as utility, and ethics. For Bentham, happiness is fundamental for 
understanding wrong and right. Bentham’s axiom is his method for answering the “what to do?” 
question that is at the heart of Lonergan’s ethics.206 Of course, Plato and Aristotle understood 
happiness as more than utility maximization. It may well be that Lonergan had Bentham’s liberal 
approach in mind when he wrote the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology:” “Liberalism: that was 
202 Stephan Herzberg, “God as Pure Thinking. An Interpretation of Metaphysics A7, 1072b14-26” in Aristotle’s 
“Metaphysics” Lambda – New Essays (ed. Christoph Horn), Philosophie der Antike, 33, 158. 
203 Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics (trans. David Ross) (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 
1098a18, 12. 
204 LEER, 26. Although not explained clearly, Lonergan's question seems to pertain to ultimate ends. 
205 Jeremy Bentham. “A Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment on Government” in The Collected Works of 
Jeremy Bentham: An Introduction to The Principles of Morals and Legislation (ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart). 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 393. 
206 See: Philip McShane, “‘What-To-Do?’” The Heart of Lonergan’s Ethics” Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis 7 
(2012), 69-93.  
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the negation of the need of higher control; what Plato longed for, the liberal threw away.”207 
The final spontaneous notion listed in section two references Bolshevism and the 
proletariat. Lonergan uses Soviet communism as an example. In this “philosophical materialist 
system,”208 happiness is generated by an equal distribution of goods and services. In the “Essay 
in Fundamental Sociology” Lonergan writes: “Bolshevism uses theory only as a starting-point: 
its intrinsic nature is the domination of the fait accompli. It is the science of propaganda, the 
strategy of revolution, the political creed of cowing men by brutality and terror, and the art of 
permanently winning their hearts by moral perversion.”209 Lonergan appears very passionate in 
his fight against Bolshevism in the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology.” It represents the low point 
of the abandonment of a search for a higher viewpoint that began with the Greek search for 
happiness and was the Christian achievement of the fusion of symbol and philosophy. He will 
later deal with this rise and fall in his notion of the longer cycle of decline.210 
In Insight, Lonergan develops a structure of the good that relates to the notion of 
happiness being discussed in this section. The first level of the good, as Lonergan writes: “is the 
object of desire and, when it is attained, it is experienced as pleasant, enjoyable, satisfying. But 
man experiences aversion no less than desire, pain no less than pleasure; and so, on this 
elementary, empirical level, the good is coupled with its opposite, the bad.”211 Searching for 
happiness as an empirical end coincides with the first level of the good. We may locate 
Bentham’s understanding of the goal of happiness at this level and perhaps we can understanding 
his axiom as a minimal concession to the demand of the second level of the good, the good of 
207 LEER, 27. Recall that this statement in made in the context of a discussion on the significance of the Christian Church. 
208 GE notes, 1. 
209 EFS, 28.   
210 CWL 3, 251-67. 
211 CWL3, 596. 
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order.212 How else are we to decide which of the possible goods is most desirable? 
To summarize briefly, if my initial reading of the material is correct, section two of the 
first sketch references five distinct notions of happiness. The first pertains to happiness as an 
end, it also suggests that we cannot determine if a person is happy until their life has finished. The 
second point lists materialistic circumstances that may affect a person’s level of happiness. The 
third places happiness in the hand of the individual; it makes happiness an active state of living 
determined by the choices of individuals respectively. The fourth holds that happiness is determined 
by what is best for the well-being and advance of the greatest number of people. In this system, 
an assessment of happiness is dependent upon a calculus of maximizing satisfactions, the 
greatest satisfaction (good) for the greatest number. The final is a materialist view point 
grounded in the notion that happiness is determined by an equal distribution of material goods. In 
this system, material possession appears to dictate happiness.  
Section Three – Ecclesiastes 
Section 3 appears to be in response to the situation that emerges when we pursue the 
spontaneous notion of happiness, unaided by a higher control that is beyond  the natural capacity of 
human beings. Lonergan has drawn a line from the title of this section to “Human wisdom brought 
to support Divine law.”213 His intentions are unclear, but it seems fair to argue that he sees the 
book of Ecclesiastes as a book of “human wisdom brought to support Divine law.”214 He has written 
“pass your days in simplicity  (ενεργεια)”215 beside the title of “Ecclesiastes” and the following line 
notes that God’s 
212 Ibid. 596-597. 
213 GE notes, 1. 
214 Ibid. We can connect this section to Lonergan's distinction between satisfaction and value found in 
Method, 240. 
215 Lonergan failed to include the accent marks in his writing of ενεργεια in this particular section. It is the only 
section within the first two pages of notes where the accents are not present in the writing of the word. The 
word also appears in a non-accented state on Page 4 of the GE notes.  
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governance and judgement are taken for granted. While Lonergan’s exact meaning is unclear, 
this appears to be a reflection on the previous section. God’s governance and ultimate judgement 
are not overly apparent in the downward progression of the spontaneous methods of achieving 
happiness listed in the previous section. Thus, perhaps the objective is to highlight that God’s 
governance and judgment are missing in the previous section. There is need for a ‘trans-
philosophical higher control.’ 
Lonergan continues section three with a series of references to the book of Ecclesiastes. I 
have provided these references as footnotes in my annotation of Doran’s transcription of the 
sketches. The first set of references are a response to the question “what does life give?” These 
scriptures appear to argue that we are born with nothing, can take nothing with us in our 
departure from life, and that all things between life’s arrival and departure are vain and 
uncertain. Lonergan references Kant in the succeeding line. Lonergan is referring to the notion 
that happiness cannot be attained systematically; there are no set of rules that generate happiness. 
Rather than rely on ‘precepts’ there are counsels of prudence, that are generated from individual 
experience to aid in our understanding of what will make us happy. Lonergan makes note of this 
in his notes on Kant: “no commands but only counsels...il problema di...” 216 
In the next line, Lonergan lists three biblical references beside the word ενεργεια. I 
believe that this is a reference to Aristotle’s notion of happiness that appears in the previous 
section of the sketch. The biblical references, in correspondence with what I have understood to 
be Aristotle’s understanding of the word ἐνέργεια,217 place happiness in active engagement with 
life; death is an inevitable end for all. Happiness happens as we actively engage in our own acts 
216 KN, 6. 
217 See: Stephan Herzberg. “God as Pure Thinking. An Interpretation of Metaphysics A7, 1072b14-26”, 158. 
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of living because there is no involvement with temporal life after death.218 The remainder of the 
section builds upon the idea that life is lived in vain by all and that death is inevitable. 
Ecclesiastes 2:11 makes happiness sound like vanity: “I considered all that my hands had done 
and the toil I had expended in doing it, and behold, all was vanity and a striving after wind, and 
there was nothing to be gained under the sun.”219  
Section Four – Buddha and Plato 
The fourth section of the text is concerned with Buddha and Plato’s notions of happiness. 
This section appears to be working as a dialectic alongside of section three. Section two 
establishes a quest for happiness and sections three and four reveal the futility of the quest.  
The Four Noble Truths of Buddhism teach that ego-consciousness uses desire as an 
illusion to preserve its existence, when desire ceases the ego becomes mere illusion. Buddhists 
seek to rest their mind in the present in an attempt to escape the illusion of desire, the ego, and 
the suffering that coincides with living elusively. Buddhists dwell: “contemplating the body in 
the body, earnestly, clearly comprehending, and mindfully, after having overcome desire and 
sorrow in regard to the world; and when he dwells contemplating feelings in feelings, the mind 
in the mind, and mental objects in mental objects, earnestly, clearly comprehending, and 
mindfully, after having overcome desire and sorrow in regard to the world, then is he said to be 
mindful.”220 Buddhism is an example of an escape from the materialistic world; for Buddhists, 
happiness is found internally. Thus, Lonergan appears to be using Buddhism and Platonism as 
examples to bring into question our spontaneous or natural notion of happiness.  
218 Ecclesiastes 9:10 (ESV) 
219 Ecclesiastes 2:11 (ESV) 
220 Bruce Park. Buddha Dharma Practice (New York: Lotus Dharma Society, 2008), 65. 
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Plato asserts the notion of a moral law throughout the Republic and critiques the societal 
system. In the Republic, Plato argues “Unless . . . philosophers become kings in the cities or 
those whom we now call kings and rulers philosophize truly and adequately and there is a 
conjunction of political power and philosophy . . . there can be no cessation of evils . . . for cities 
nor, I think, for the human race.”221 Lonergan quotes this passage at the beginning of the “Essay 
in Fundamental Sociology.”222 It is clearly a passage that Lonergan saw as important. I believe 
that a direct link between the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” and these sketches can be made 
through this passage. This section may be a reflection of ideas that Lonergan had already worked 
out in the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology.” 
Lonergan uses Plato’s Republic and Gorgias as examples that cross examine the earlier 
established spontaneous or natural notion of happiness. In the Gorgias, Socrates argues that an 
unjust man cannot be happy: “was not this the point in dispute, my friend? You deemed Archelaus 
happy, because he was a very great criminal and unpunished: I, on the other hand, maintained that 
he or any other who like him has done wrong and has not been punished, is, and ought to be, the 
most miserable of all men; and that the doer of injustice is more miserable than the sufferer; 
and he who escapes punishment, more miserable than he who suffers.”223 In some sense, section 
four is a pivotal point within Lonergan’s outline, it is where he shifts attention from the 
spontaneous materialistic notion of happiness and introduces the notion of a moral law. 
Lonergan also references the Gorgias dialogue in his letter to Fr. Keane which, as we 
may recall, was written shortly after the GE sketches. The letter reads:  
To give a more precise instance, I was discussing the Nicomachean Ethics with 
221 Plato’s Republic V.473c11-d6 
222 OLNDH, 68. 
223 Plato’s Gorgias Dialogue (translated by: Benjamin Jowett) available online at: http://www.sacred-
texts.com/cla/plato/gorgias.htm  
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Fr Nunan, our biennist here writing a thesis on the idea of the good. I advanced 
that Aristotle was a bourgeois, that he introduced the distinction 
between speculative and practical to put the 'good' as Socrates and Plato 
conceived it out of court, that he did so because he could not answer the 
dialectic of, say, the Gorgias, and could not admit its conclusion that 
happiness was compatible with suffering. This I believe manifest from countless 
texts.223
In both the GE sketches and Lonergan’s letter to Fr. Keane, he discusses the Gorgias dialogue in 
the context of a quest for happiness. The provided reference may be beneficial when attempting 
to understand the GE sketches.  
Section Five – Moral Theory 
With the concept of moral law in mind, Lonergan now considers moral theory. He 
divides the section into three main components: Stoic logos, Augustine, and Scholastics. At the 
bottom of the section he writes a reminder to not forget “sentiment, analysis of virtue.” Perhaps 
this is a reference to Hume and Aquinas? Hume grounded his ethics in a theory of sentiments.224 
Lonergan refers to Hume in the Keeler review.225 Aquinas has an extensive discussion of the 
virtues in the Summa Theologica. In any case, this section reveals a connection between this 
sketch and chapter 18 of Insight. Lonergan has begun to formulate more explicitly his ideas on a 
metaphysics of ethics.  
The Stoics believed in λόγος (logos), an operative principle that gave life. The λόγος is 
present in all human beings and is similar to the concept of God as divine creator. Lonergan uses 
the term “Sequi naturam” (“follow your nature”), which is the basis for the Stoic understanding of 
natural law. The Stoics believe man has both nature and reason; reason is the channel that the 
224 See David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. 
225 CWL 20, 137. 
223 BLFK, 5. 
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divine logos uses to direct man’s decision making. Maryanne Horowitz writes: “Man, distinct in 
this from all other things, has a reason of his own, through which the divine logos flows: man 
may spurn this divine gift and lead a wicked life, or he may be guided by reason to God’s 
universal law and accordingly lead a life of righteousness.”226 In Stoicism, adhering to reason 
and the development of reason makes you a moral being. In doing so, you become more like 
logos. The Stoics replaced the quest for happiness with a quest for righteousness, just as the first 
sketch is shifting from a focus on happiness per se to incorporate the supernatural context for 
human living.  
Augustine’s moral theory differs from Stoicism. For Augustine, there is a moral law 
written on the heart of every man, lex naturalis.227 This principle of moral law is illustrated by 
Augustine in Confessions Book II, in the incident of the stolen pears:  
             Theft receives certain punishment by your law (Exod. 20: 15), Lord, and by 
the law written in the hearts of men (Rom. 2:14) which not even iniquity itself 
destroys. For what thief can with equanimity endure being robbed by another 
thief? He cannot tolerate it even if he is rich and the other is destitute. 228 
In this example, Augustine shows how the lex naturalis is written on the heart of all men, 
including the wicked and unjust.  
Lonergan however, uses the phrase lex aeterna (eternal law) rather than lex naturalis 
(natural law) when referencing Augustine. In On Free Choice of the Will Book 1, Augustine 
discusses the difference between eternal law (lex aeterna) and temporal law.229 Temporal law 
226 Maryanne Cline Horowitz. “The Stoic Synthesis of the Idea of Natural Law in Man: Four Themes,” Journal of 
the History of Ideas, 35:1 (1974), 4. 
227 Daniel Patte and Eugene TeSelle. Engaging Augustine on Romans: Self, Context, and Theology in Interpretation. 
(Harrisburg, PA: A&C Black, 2003), 151. See also: A. H. Chroust. (1973) The Fundamental Ideas in Augustine’s 
Philosophy of Moral Law,” American Journal of Jurisprudence, 18, 59-79. 
228 Confessions, Book II.iv (9), 28-29. 
229 Augustine. On Free Choice of the Will (trans. Th. Williams). (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993). 
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can change, preserves peace within society,230 and must be derived from eternal law. Following 
only the temporal law will result in an unhappy life.231 Eternal law is unchanging, pressed upon 
all human minds,232 and commands the soul to be ruled by reason.233 Adhering to eternal law 
results in a happy life.234 Essentially, lex aeterna and lex naturalis are the same principle.  
  At this point, there are two distinct aspects of moral theory emerging. First, there is the 
concept of a moral law that is an intrinsic part of man’s being. Secondly, although present in 
earlier sections of the sketch, the notion of choice becomes an important factor in the equation 
for happiness. The notion of a concrete good, common to all rational beings, appears. In chapter 
18 of Insight, Lonergan explores the notion of the good in section I and the notion of will in 
section I.2.235  
 
 Section Six – Progress of philosophy according to St. Thomas 
 In this section, Lonergan appears to have been preparing to compare Kant’s 
understanding of the progress of philosophy with Aquinas. The notes within this section do not 
contain details pertaining to Lonergan’s thought process, but it is apparent that he felt Kant had a 
more explicit concern with the progress of philosophy, thus connecting this section more directly 
to Lonergan’s notes on Kant which, as we may recall, were likely composed around the same 
time.236 A large portion of the notes on Kant are in Italian, but page two of the notes relates 
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directly to section six of these sketches.237  
 Page two of the notes on Kant reads:  
 
B.L. True that the good will is a rigorous criterion while earthly eudemonism is 
no criterion at all [cf. Ignatian indifference to all in the world * Thomas “bonum 
hominis est sedum notimem esse”] But, the Kantian expression says more than 
this, though his proof lead to no broader conclusion. The good will is the moral 
good: but only the case of the act preformed solely out of a sense of duty – per 
Repetto alla legge [observance of the law] – can we be certain of the goodness 
of the will – can we be certain that a man is not honest merely because honesty 
is the best policy, etc. cf pp. 14.15 – Therefore, the good will is the will that 
acts solely “per reispetto alla legge.”238  
 
 
 I cannot be certain that this passage is what Lonergan had in mind, but it appears to make some 
sense. Sections one through five of the first sketch have progressed somewhat naturally from one 
another; each subsequent section has related and expanded upon the previous. Given that pattern, 
sections five and seven can be useful tools for understanding section six. With this structure in 
mind, a section pertaining to the nature of the will does not seem out of place.  
 
 Section Seven – Dynamic [amor sapientiae]…more precise foundation of ethic 
  The Latin phrase amor sapientiae means “love of wisdom.”239 In Confessions, Augustine 
progresses from understanding the love of wisdom as a self-destructive path240 to viewing it as 
an intrinsic part of his Christian journey.241 His understanding of philosophy shifts while reading 
Cicero’s book titled Hortensius.242 Lonergan appears to be using a desire for wisdom that 
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develops over time (dynamic), as a foundation for a more precise foundation of ethics. The 
second line may be referencing Aristotle’s four cause theory of metaphysics. Lonergan has 
omitted Aristotle’s final cause.  
 The following line deals with finality. In 1943, Lonergan wrote an essay titled “Finality, 
Love, Marriage.”243 In the essay, he defines finality:  
 
…Finality is affirmed, besides the absolute reference of all things to God and 
the horizontal reference of each thing to its commensurate motives and ends, 
a vertical dynamism and tendency, an upthurst from lower to higher levels of 
appetition and process; thus are provided the empty categories of the ultimate 
solution, since horizontal ends are shown to be more essential and vertical 
ends more excellent.244   
 
 
Although this definition was written eight years later, it fits the context of these sketches. 
Lonergan developed, at least in part, a notion of finality prior to the composition of “Finality, 
Love, Marriage.” The notion of finality also links to chapter 15 of Insight. In Insight Lonergan 
writes: “By finality we refer to a theorem of the same generality as the notion of being. This 
theorem affirms a parallelism between the dynamism of the mind and the dynamism of 
proportionate being.”245  
 Continuing with our analysis, on the final line of page one of the sketches, we see a clear 
reference to a line found in the notes on Kant: “una dialectica natural, cioè una tendenza a 
ragionare sottilmente, anche falsamente contro questa legge severa del dovere” [a natural 
dialectic, that is a tendency to reason subtly, but incorrectly against this strict law of need.]”246 I 
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am presently uncertain about the implications of this passage. While my concern here is 
primarily orientated toward research, to present the relevant data, I hope that future endeavors 
will find my efforts useful for more fully understanding the text. Nonetheless, the emergence of 
the notion of finality here in the first sketch is I think significant, especially in light of the central 
significance of (1) the pure desire to know and (2) the notion of finality in Insight.  
 
Research: Page Two: 
 There are no left-hand enumerations on page two of the sketches. As Doran suggests, this 
may mean the entirety of page two is a continuation of section seven.247 Doran’s argument 
makes sense if we view the entirety of the page as a “more precise foundation of ethic.”248 The 
first sketch has focused on compiling a variety of arguments up until this point. From this point 
onward, it appears that Lonergan is developing his own notion of ethics based on arguments and 
counter arguments presented on the first page of the sketch and in his notes on Kant. If we 
operate under the assumption that the third and fourth pages of the file are a repetition of the first 
two pages, arguing that page two is a continuation of section seven seems reasonable. In the 
second sketch, pages three through four, we see the same pattern of seven distinct divisions of 
text, with the final section extending across multiple pages without left hand enumerations.    
 Lonergan’s notion of ethics begins with man as the potential mover. In the “Essay in 
Fundamental Sociology” Lonergan writes:  
 
Hence, everything that a man does or thinks is pre-moved by the action of other 
things. Further, this pre-motion extends into the intellectual field and 
constitutes the pre-motion of the will. In response to this release of pre-motion 
the will need not act: but if it does act then it acts according to the pre-
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determined intellectual form; if it does not act, then it sins in failing to follow 
the dictate of reason, while what takes place in action is pre-determined by the 
sensitive mobiles, the previous intellectual pattern, habits, etc., all of which are 
pre-determined….besides the unity of human nature there is the unity of 
human action. Human action is always pre-determined to either of two 
alternatives: one is rational the other irrational.249  
 
 
 This passage further links the sketches to the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” and provides 
insight that I think is useful for understanding the notion of ethics that is developing in the 
sketches. 
 In the first division on page two, he has listed four categories: a) potency, external mover 
c) prearranged by God b) man’s choice – reason or impulse d) Social effect. Lonergan’s list 
appears at first glance to be disorientated; rather than arrange things chronologically, he has 
chosen to list them in the order of a, c, b, d. He has underlined the fourth category (social effect), 
which may be relevant to the foundations for his notion of the good of order found in chapter 18 
of Insight. It is clear that Lonergan is developing a notion of ethics with a specific focus on 
human responsibility, God, freedom of choice, reason and impulse, and the societal effect of 
decisions. Many of these topics are also discussed in the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology.” 
The following passages from the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” are worth quoting in full. 
First we see a discussion of reason as it pertains to human responsibility and the internal and 
immanent and external and transient action of man. 
 
Finally, the end of the individual as an individual is to accept the intellec tua l 
forms (effective assent to the true, consent to the good); by this means he attains 
the ἐνέργεια of his personality; on the other hand, inasmuch as he fails to accept 
the intelligible dictate and make it effective, he is merely predetermined by the 
physical flow; also, he sins for sin is the failure to obey reason. But on top of this 
immanent end of individuals as individuals there is the external flow of action, 
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which is reasonable or unreasonable according to the goodness of the individua ls, 
which nonetheless is something in itself. Now we must grasp the intimate 
connection between the internal and immanent action of man and his external and 
transient action.250 
Secondly, we see a discussion of action that incorporates a notion of the supernatural: 
Now, plainly it is impossible to inﬂuence human wills to do good without exerting 
an inﬂuence upon the external action that pre-moves and statistically pre-
determines wills. This is the claim of the church, of spiritual authority. On the 
other hand, the ﬂow of human action considered merely as an external ﬂow is for 
deﬁnite ends yet entirely under the control of the wills. This is the basis of the 
continuous rebellions of the state from mediaeval times to the present day.251 
The following section explicitly introduces the supernatural for the first time within the 
sketch. Up until this point, the sketch has been concerned with human action and the quest for 
happiness. In this section, we are introduced to the supernatural and a third type of motivating force: 
transcendent reason. So far, the first sketch has focused on spontaneity and reason as the two 
primary motivators of the will, but here we are introduced to a third motivating factor.  
The next portion of text deals with the dialectic of history and is clearly related to the 
“Essay in Fundamental Sociology.” William Matthews makes an interesting point when he notes 
that in the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology,” Lonergan understood the philosophy of history to 
be a pure theory of external human action. In a single action there are three things: “a physico-
sensitive flow of change, the intellectual forms with respect to the phantasmal flux, and the 
power of imposing intellectual forms upon the flow of change that comes from the will.”252 I 
think that Matthews highlights what is going on in Lonergan’s notion of ethics in this sketch; 
250 Ibid., 18. 
251 EFS, 19. 
252 LQ, 73. 
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there is an understanding of action emerging that is relevant to developing a metaphysic of 
ethics.  
 Thus, there appears to be a connection between Lonergan’s notion of ethics and his 
understanding of the dialectic of history. The first sketch clearly incorporates the dialectic of 
history that we see in the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology.” This connection is not surprising, 
given that Lonergan was interested in economics and the dialectic of history at this point in his 
life.253 In this sketch, Lonergan’s metaphysic of ethic and metaphysic for the dialectic of history 
appear to intertwine with notions of theology.  
 Beside “Dialectics of History” Lonergan writes “nature, sin, supernature.” From what I 
have understood so far, human beings are rational beings by nature. Sin is a failure to obey 
reason. Following these ideas, a supernature is perhaps a compliance with reason that cooperates 
with a solution to the problem of sin. I believe that we can make a connection between what is 
going on in the remainder of Lonergan’s sketches and chapter 20 of Insight. Lonergan writes:  
 
…when this problem of evil is met by a supernatural solution, human perfection 
itself becomes a limit to be transcended, and then, the dialectic is transformed 
from a bipolar to a tripolar conjunction and opposition. The humanist viewpoint 
loses its primacy, not by some extrinsicist invasion, but by submitting to its own 
immanent necessities. For if the humanist is to stand by the exigencies of his 
own unrestricted desire, if he is to yield to the demands for openness set by every 
further question, then he will discover the limitations that imply man’s 
incapacity for sustained development, he will acknowledge and consent to the 
one solution that exists and, if that solution is supernatural, his very humanism 
will lead beyond itself.254 
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Lonergan is ultimately grounding his notion of ethics in the Catholic Christian tradition. 
The supernatural component of Lonergan’s dialectic of history is Christian. It is a system that is 
grounded in faith, hope, and charity. Lonergan notes that the nation-state tends to be the rallying 
point for a lower tendency,255 which may be a critique of the humanist tendency of political 
authority figures, much like Plato’s Republic. It worth recalling that in the “Essay in 
Fundamental Sociology” Lonergan writes: “There is much on the present world-situation to 
confirm the view that liberalism in power is for the destruction of civilization.”256  In the context 
of that essay, liberalism means the liberal nation-state.  
 The next division concerns action. He divides the section into three categories and 
subdivides the third category into four subcategories. Action is divided into three categories: 
moral, ἐνέργεια, and effective. Lonergan has written “overlooked by Kant” on the margin of the 
text with an arrow drawn to “effective.”257 I believe that Lonergan is arguing that human action 
has three main facets, they are (1) moral, (2) what we are remembered for, and (3) effective. 
Human action is concerned with morality and value; our actions have value. In the second line, 
Lonergan writes: “as ἐνέργεια – the days of my life, shall we remember them?” This line may be 
suggesting that our actions are remembered by others. Lastly, our actions are effective, they have 
motive and meaning. Lonergan has underlined “living is giving” and has noted that reason treats 
all men as equal to self. Lonergan has provided a list of four motives of action: 1) Economic 
division of Labour, 2) Family, 3) Science, art, Research and teaching 4) giving morally – estote 
imitators mei, meaning “be imitators of me.” This is likely a reference to the words of Paul in 1 
Corinthians 11:1. It is interesting that Lonergan has chosen to underline “living is giving” and 
                                                                 
255 GE notes, 2. 
256 LEER, 16. 
257 Ibid.  
54 
“estote imitators mei” in this section. I think it shows a desire to ground his notion of ethics in 
theology.  
Given that Lonergan highlights “effective” as overlooked by Kant, what does Lonergan 
mean when he speaks of effective motive and meaning? Perhaps a clue can be found in Method 
in Theology in a passage from chapter three, Meaning, where Lonergan discusses constitutive 
meaning. It is worth quoting in full. 
A third function of meaning is constitutive. Just as language is 
constituted by articulate sound and meaning, so social institutions and 
human cultures have meanings as intrinsic components. Religions and 
art-forms, languages and literatures, sciences, philosophies, histories, 
all are inextricably involved in acts of meaning. What is true of cultural 
achievements, no less is true of social institutions. The family, the state, 
the law, the economy are not fixed and immutable entities. They adapt 
to changing circumstances; they can be reconceived in the light of new 
ideas; they can be subjected to revolutionary change. But all such 
change involves change of meaning - a change of idea or concept, a 
change of judgment or evaluation, a change of the order or request. The 
state can be changed by rewriting its constitution. More subtly but no 
less effectively it can be changed by reinterpreting the constitution or, 
again by working on men’s minds and hearts to change the objects that 
command their respect, hold their allegiance, fire their loyalty.258 
This passage perhaps best reflects the eventual development that moves out of a critique of 
Kant’s governance by consistent adherence to law, per respetto alla legge, to the metaphysic 
of ethics founded on a dynamic account of effective action that we find in Insight. It is here 
and in the “Essay on Fundamental Sociology” that we see the first sparks of that later 
achievement.  
The fourth section on page two of the sketch is headed “virtue” and is divided into the 
topics of wisdom, justice, temperance and fortitude (the four cardinal virtues) and prudence, 
faith, hope, and charity (the three theological virtues). Beside “prudence” Lonergan has 
written: 
258 Bernard Lonergan. Method in Theology. (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972), 78. 
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“re application of wisdom to ἄπειρον.” Apeiron can be translated to mean “infinite” or “without 
boundaries.” Following “charity” Lonergan has included a Latin translation of the final verse of 
the Gregorian chant “Adoro Te Devote.” In English, the chant reads: “I beseech thee send me 
what I thirst for so, some day to gaze on thee face to face in light, and be blest forever with thy 
glory's sight.”259 
This section relates directly to the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology.” Michael Shute 
argues that, in his discussion of the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology,” “there must be both a 
development of mind and a change of heart that works to restore human history to its proper 
ends.260 Lonergan writes: “The hope for the future lies in a philosophical presentation of the 
supernatural concept of social order.”261 In this section, we see reference to a love for wisdom 
(amor sapientiae) and a notion of reason that treats all men as equal.262 Assuming that Shute’s 
assessment of “the Essay in Fundamental Sociology” is correct, the topics of wisdom and justice 
in this section may be a reference to “a development of mind.”263 Of all the sections of text so 
far, this portion shows the largest connection to the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology.” The 
notions of faith, hope, and charity are at the heart of the remaining pages of the “Essay in 
Fundamental Sociology.” 
The second last section of page two is titled “motivation: main thing is to observe the 
law; man is body and soul.” In the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology,” Lonergan writes about the 
law in relation to a dialectic of history and ethics: “Humanity must first discover its law and then 
apply it: to discover the law is a long process and to apply it a painful process but it has to be 
259 Lyrics available online at: http://www.chantcd.com/lyrics/godhead_here_hiding.htm  
260 “Let Us Be Practical!” 15. 
261 Ibid. [Quote taken from page 118 of the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology”]. 
262 In the following section, Lonergan lists “Value – as effective – Living is giving. [Reason treats all men as equal 
to self.] 
263 “Let Us Be Practical!” 15.  
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done.”264 The second line, “Serviam mente, serviam et corpori” is Latin and translates “serve 
with mind, serve with body.” This relates directly to the last part of the first line “man is body 
and soul.” Lonergan uses the remainder of this section to further connect his notion of the 
dialectic of history and his notion of ethics with Christianity. He lists four factors that motivate 
Christians to serve the law: 1) Heaven and Hell, 2) Reason, 3) Gratitude, and 4) Achievement. 
Beside “gratitude” Lonergan has written “qui eripuit nos de potestate tenebrarum” which is a 
reference to Colossians 1:13: “for He has rescued us from the dominion of darkness.” Beside 
“achievement” he has written “Adveniat regnum tuum: estote imitators mei” (may your kingdom 
come: be imitators of me). He notes that “achievement” is overlooked by Kant and also draws an 
arrow linking it to “zeal for souls – spark that leaps from example”.265 
The final section of the sketch deals with the supernatural. To show its connection to the 
“Essay in Fundamental Sociology” I refer again to Shute. Shute writes:  
…intelligence is not enough. The effective solution depends upon the 
appearance of a higher supernatural viewpoint than can meet the source of the 
deformation of the reign of sin in the conscience of individuals. Thus, while 
correct theory is an essential component for the reversal of the modern crisis, 
an effective solution depends upon the emergence of a higher supernatura l 
viewpoint and its corresponding integration with concrete living.266 
 The final line of the first sketch reads: “Excessive disregard of human element is seed of 
spark.”267 I believe that this line alludes to a shift in focus from our own lives to the supernatural. 
The higher viewpoint, within the sketch, appears to be the realization that our lives are not 
simply about our egotistical selves, rather, they are about our relationship to God and so are part 
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of a dialectic much larger than our individual lives. 
Summary 
Throughout the first sketch, we have seen a notion of ethics develop in relation to 
Lonergan’s critique of Kant’s understanding of metaphysics. This sketch is divided into seven 
sections that first establish a problematic understanding of happiness and then provide a solution 
for the problem. Lonergan combines the dialectic of history, the structure of metaphysics, and 
Catholic theology in his approach to the issue. I argue that his solution is to develop a 
groundwork for the metaphysics of ethics, a goal that found its explicit published expression in 
chapter 18 of Insight. I will argue this point extensively in my final chapter.  
There are two sets of sketches remaining in File A13. The second sketch, pages three 
through four of the file, are clearly a refinement of the envisaged project outlined in the first 
sketch. The third sketch, page five of the file, may be a much more precise refinement of the 
second sketch or a separate sketch on happiness. In the following chapter, I will highlight the 
refinement that occurs between the first and second set of sketches. I will note places where there 
is a clear progression of thought between the different sets of sketches and track all revisions 
made to the second sketch. Lastly, I will briefly explore the final page of the file, the third sketch 
titled “Happiness,” and establish an argument for its distinction from the other two sketches. 
With these goals in mind, let us proceed to chapter four.  
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Chapter Four: The Second and Third Sketches 
I have divided this chapter into two main sections. In the first section, I will compare the 
second sketch, pages three through four, with the first sketch. To do this, I will make note of the 
revisions that occur. Although the second sketch follows the same project outlined in the first 
sketch, there are some changes to the ordering of the text and in the terminology used. I will 
highlight where text has been added to the second sketch. Likewise, I will note when text from 
the first sketch does not appear in the second. In the second section, I will explore the fifth and 
final page of the GE sketches.  
In this chapter, I will make the case that there are, in fact, three distinct divisions within 
the GE sketches. As you may recall, Robert Doran suggests that the GE sketches are composed 
of two sets of sketches that contain much of the same material.268 In my initial reading of the file 
I came to the same conclusion. However, after careful reflection my understanding changed. As I 
now understand the texts, in addition to the two sketches for a metaphysics of ethics, there is a 
discrete third section. The first sketch, which I have explored extensively in the previous chapter, 
contains seven sections that appear to be the first attempt to sketch a proposal for the metaphysic 
of customs or ethics. The second sketch begins on the third page and is a more refined and 
developed version of the first sketch. The third division, which we find at the end of the GE 
sketches on page five, is either a very compact version of the content found in the first and 
second sketches, or is a separate set of notes on the theme of happiness. This is clear from the 
titles marking off each section. The first and second sketch are titled “General Ethic 
[Metaphysic of Customs].” The third sketch appears to be titled “Happiness.”269 
268 DT, 1.  
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A Comparison of the Sketches 
 As the second sketch follows the same general outline as the first sketch, the second 
sketch would be best categorized as a refined version of the first sketch. Lonergan has slightly 
modified the order in the second sketch. He amalgamates the first section of the second sketch 
into the following six sections and section five is split into two sub-sections, one on Stoicism, the 
other on Augustine. Although the ordering has changed, the project itself appears to remain 
fundamentally the same in both sketches. I have provided a chart that outlines the basic 
structure of the first two sketches using Lonergan’s titles for each section:  
Table 4.1: Comparing the Order of the Sketches 
The First Sketch The Second Sketch 
1. Origin of Philosophy 1. Happiness is an Ideal of the Imagination
2. Spontaneous Notion of Happiness 2. Negation of Foregoing
3. Ecclesiastes 3. Assertion of Morality
4. Buddha and Plato 4. Development of Morality
5. Moral Theory 5. Augustine
6. Progress of Philosophy According to
St. Thomas
6. Examination of Kant
7. Dynamic (armor sapientiae) as well as
More Precise Foundation of Ethic
7. Scholastic System – Rights and Duties
Keeping in mind the basic order of the sketches, we turn our attention to a comparative analysis 
between the first and second sketch.  
Sketch Two – Section One: 
The second sketch begins with a section titled “happiness as an ideal of the 
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imagination.”270 This section is a refined version of section two from the first sketch.271 The title 
of the section has changed from “spontaneous notion of happiness. ideal of the imagination”272 
to “ideal of the imagination.”273 It is plausible that the section was originally titled “spontaneous 
notion of happiness” and later became “ideal of the imagination” in both sets of sketches. If you 
look closely at the first page of the original manuscript, the title “spontaneous notion of 
happiness” is followed by a period, suggesting the title originally ended there. Following the 
period, we see a large portion of space before “ideal of the imagination” is written.274 This 
suggests that “ideal of the imagination” was written as a later addition to the sketch. When 
writing the revised version of the sketches, Lonergan uses the new title. 
Lonergan’s new title was most likely inspired by his reading of Kant. In Kant’s 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Customs, he argues that happiness is an ideal of the 
imagination. The passage is worth quoting in full: 
One cannot act in accordance with determinate principles in order to be 
happy, but only in accordance with empirical counsels, e.g., of diet, frugality, 
politeness, restraint, etc., of which experience teaches that they most promote 
welfare on the average. It follows from this that the imperatives of prudence, 
to speak precisely, cannot command at all, i.e., cannot exhibit actions 
objectively as practically necessary; that they are sooner to be taken as 
advisings (consilia) than as commands (praecepta) of reason; that the 
problem of determining, certainly and universally, what action will promote 
the happiness of a rational being, is fully insoluble, hence no imperative in 
regard to it is possible, which would command us, in the strict sense, to do 
what would make us happy, because happiness is an ideal not of reason but 
of imagination, resting merely on empirical grounds, of which it would be 
futile to expect that they should determine an action through which to attain 
the totality of a series of consequences which are in fact infinite.275 
270 GE sketches, 3, section 1, line 1. 
271 Ibid., 1 section 2, line 1. 
272 The title as it appears in the first sketch: GE sketches, 1, section 2, line 1. 
273 Ibid., 3, section 1, line 1. 
274 Ibid., 1, section 2, line 1. 
275 Passage taken from: Immanuel Kant. “Second Section: Transition from Popular Moral Philosophy to the 
Metaphysics of Morals” in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 35. Available online at: 
www.pitt.edu/~mthompso/readings/GroundworkII.pdf 
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Since, as I have argued, the GE sketches are indeed primarily a response to Lonergan’s reading 
of Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Customs, it seems reasonable to argue that 
changing the title from “spontaneous notion of happiness” to “ideal of the imagination” is 
inspired by this passage from Kant. 
The second line of the revised sketch is a new addition. It reads: “ἀνήρ σαρκικός 
economic man.” In Greek, the phrase means “man of flesh.” I associate the phrase with Paul the 
Apostle and the book of Romans. Both Lonergan and Paul are referring to the carnal nature of 
man when they use the word σαρκικός.276 Lonergan seems to be connecting ‘economic man’ 
with the carnal or material nature of man.  This reference most likely relates to Lonergan’s 
developing thoughts on economics at this time. Lonergan will remark in his essay “For a New 
Political Economy” that underlying the superstructure of culture “there stands as foundation the 
purely economic field concerned with nourishment, and shelter, clothing, utilities, services, and 
amusement.”277 
The third and fourth lines of the revised sketch introduce: reason, impulse, and desire. 
They are part of the seventh section in the first sketch. In the revised sketch, a notion of the 
metaphysic of customs or ethics develops earlier than it does in the first. In the first sketch, a 
notion of the metaphysic of ethics is not clearly in place until the seventh section. In the second 
sketch it informs the entirety of the revised sketch, thus reinforcing the case that Lonergan is 
honing his focus on this topic. It appears that Lonergan has divided the text into three sections. 
As previously discussed, the first section introduces the ἀνήρ σαρκικός (fleshly man). The text 
appears to discuss ἀνήρ σαρκικός until the end of the third page. At the top of page four, there is 
276 See: Romans 7-8. 
277 CWL21, 12. 
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an addition to the text that, like ἀνήρ σαρκικός, is not included in the first sketch. The addition 
is: ἀνήρ ψυχικὸς meaning “natural man.”278 ἀνήρ ψυχικὸς is the focus of discussion until the 
seventh section, where we are introduced to the spiritual man (ἀνήρ πνευματικός).279 The three 
types of human beings act as divisions within the text. The first two sections discuss the fleshly 
man, sections three through six are concerned with the natural man, and section seven pertains to 
the spiritual man. This division anticipates that same division that is a central concern of the 
latter 1935 essay “Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis” and which anticipates the division of human process 
into nature, history and supernatural that is an organizing principle for the 1943 essay “Finality, 
Love, Marriage.”280 
In the first sketch, Lonergan lists five spontaneous notions of happiness: 1) Solon and 
Croesus 2) health, wealth, friends, position, security, occupation, some religion to give 
resignation to death 3) Aristotle’s ἐνέργεια 4) Bentham and Utilitarian 5) Bolshevism.281 The list 
is not included in the revised sketch. Solon and Croesus are removed completely, the list in 
number two is shortened and joined with Aristotle’s ἐνέργεια; they are given their own 
subsection in the first section of the revised sketch. Bentham, Utilitarianism, and Bolshevism are 
amalgamated into one category labelled “social systems.”282  
It is interesting that more attention is given to Aristotle at the beginning of the revised 
sketch. In both sketches, Aristotle’s ἐνέργεια is continuously referred to. In the first sketch, it is 
included as part of a list in the second section.283 In the revised sketch, a significant portion of 
the first section is dedicated to Aristotle.284 The seventh line of the revised sketch reads: “a 
278 GE sketches, 4. 
279 Ibid., 4, section 7, line 2. 
280 See: “Finality, Love, Marriage,” 42-48. cf. the diagram on p. 42. 
281 GE sketches, 1, section 2, line 3. 
282 Ibid., 3, section 1, lines 5-6. 
283 Ibid., 1, section 2. 
284 Ibid., 3, section 1, lines 7-10. 
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possible interpretation of Nicomachean Ethic.”285 
Other changes relating to Aristotle are made in the revised sketch. Firstly, Lonergan has 
changed the language he uses when referring to Aristotle’s notion of happiness. In the first 
sketch, he writes: “Aristotle puts happiness in occupation (ἐνέργεια).”286 In the revised sketch, 
“Aristotle puts the end in activity itself - ἐνέργεια.”287 Additionally, the lines “death as a matter 
of course”288 and “does not try to solve riddle”289 do not appear in the revised sketch. The 
revised sketch adds the line: “[Aristotle] subordinates the external as a means to end a humanly 
necessary means [competence, position, friends].”290  
Sketch Two – Section Two: 
Section two in the revised sketch is titled “negation of foregoing.”291 It appears to be a 
revised version of the third section in the first sketch. Much of the content in both sketches is 
identical. The obvious change is that, in the revised sketch, Lonergan has provided some 
scriptural quotations. In the first sketch, all scriptures appear as references, quotations are not 
provided. The scriptures are ordered differently in the revised sketch. Additionally, Ecclesiastes 
211 is omitted from the revised sketch and Ecclesiastes 49-12 is added. I have created a chart that 
allows us to easily compare how the scriptures are ordered in both sketches: 
285 Ibid., 3, section 1, line 7. 
286 Ibid., 1, section 2, line 5. 
287 Ibid., 3, section1, line 8. 
288 Ibid., 1, section 2, line 6. 
289 Ibid. 
290 Ibid., 3, section 1, lines 9-10. 
291 Ibid., 3, section 2, line 1.  
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Table 4.2: Ecclesiastes References 
The First Sketch The Second Sketch 
Section 
Verses from 
Ecclesiastes 
Section 
Verses from 
Ecclesiastes 
What does life give? 48, 222, 39, 514-15 
Vanity of 
achievement 
21-11
ενεργεια 322, 517, 94-10 Vanity of Wisdom 212-26, 68
Incomprehensibility 
of life 
817, cf. 41-3, 92,3,11, 12, 
105-7
Reflection 48
Vanity of 
achievement 
1211 
Quotation Provided 222
Referenced 39, 514-15 
Vanity of wisdom 21-11, 211-26, 68 Quotation Provided 322
ἐνέργεια cf. 517, 94-10
Quotation Provided 41-3
Ecc. 211 omitted from second sketch 
Ecc. 49-12 are an addition to the second 
sketch  
Friendship 49-12
Quotation Provided 817 
Referenced 92,3,11,12, 105-7  
Quotation Provided 1211
There are in total sixteen revisions made in this section. Firstly, “Buddha: desire an 
illusion, happiness an escape to?”292 is added to the section. It appears in the fourth section in the 
first sketch.293 Secondly, in the first sketch, “God’s governance and ultimate judgement taken for 
granted”294 is the second line in the third section. In the revised sketch, it is moved to the final 
line in section two.295 Thirdly, the line “pass your days in simplicity (ενεργεια)”296 is not 
included in the second sketch. Fourthly, in the first sketch, “vanity of achievement”297 and 
“vanity of wisdom”298 appear at the end of the third section,299 in the revised sketch, they are 
moved to the beginning of the second section and are the first reference to Ecclesiastes in the 
292 Ibid., 3, section 2, line 2.  
293 Ibid., 1 section 4, line 1.  
294 Ibid., 1, section 3, line 2. 
295 Ibid., 3 section 2, line 28. 
296 Ibid., 1, section 2, line 1. 
297 Ibid., 1, section 3, line 9. 
298 Ibid.  
299 Ibid., 1, section 3, line 10. 
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sketch.300 Fifthly, Lonergan has edited the scriptural reference that he uses as an example of 
“vanity of wisdom.” As previously mentioned, he references Ecclesiastes 211-26 in the first sketch 
and changes it to Ecclesiastes 212-26 in the revised sketch. Sixthly, beside “vanity of 
achievement”301 and “vanity of wisdom”302 Lonergan has written “Reflection 48,”303 which does 
not appear anywhere in the first sketch. Seventhly, Ecclesiastes 48 is used to answer the question 
“what does life give?” in the first sketch.304 The question does not appear anywhere in the 
revised sketch. Eighthly, Ecclesiastes 222, 39 and 514, 15 are written beside “what does life give?” 
in the first sketch.305 In the revised sketch, Ecclesiastes 222 is quoted at length306 and Ecclesiastes 
39 and 514, 15 are written as references at the end of the verse.307 
The ninth revision pertains to the terminology that Lonergan uses to reference Kant. In 
the first sketch he writes: “cf. Kant – impossibility of systematic attainment of happiness 
[counsel not precept].”308 In the revised sketch: “cf. Kant Impossibility of systematic and 
infallible plan for attaining an empirical end.”309 The statements are very similar. In the first 
sketch, Lonergan notes that Kant faced the impossibility of a systematic attainment of happiness. 
In the second sketch, he is noting the impossibility of a systematic attainment of happiness and 
the impossibility of an infallible plan for attaining an empirical end.  
The tenth revision comes after Lonergan’s reference to Kant. The revised sketch quotes 
Ecclesiastes 322.310 In the first sketch, Lonergan uses Ecclesiastes 322, 517, and 94-10 as examples 
300 Ibid., 3, section 2, line 5. 
301 Ibid., 3, section 2, line 3. 
302 Ibid., 3, section 2, line 4. 
303 Ibid., 3, section 2, line 3. 
304 Ibid., 1, section 3, line 3. 
305 Ibid., 1, section 3, line 3. 
306 Ibid., 3, section 2, lines 5-7. 
307 Ibid., 3, section 2, line 7. 
308 Ibid., 1, section 3, line 4. 
309 Ibid., 3, section 2, lines 4-5. 
310 Ibid., 3, section 2, lines 6-7. 
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of ενεργεια.311 In this sketch, he quotes the verse and then references Aristotle’s ἐνέργεια, 
Ecclesiastes 517, and 94-10. In the first sketch, ενεργεια appears without accents, in the revised 
sketch the accents are included, marking an eleventh revision. Notably, in Ecclesiastes 322, 
Solomon uses the Greek word ποιήμασιν (workmanship), not ἐνέργεια. Although the 
terminology differs between Solomon and Aristotle, the overall concept is consistent.  
In the first sketch, Ecclesiastes 41-3 is used alongside of Ecclesiastes 817, 92, 3, 11, 12 and 
105-7 as references for the “incomprehensibility of life.”312 In the revised sketch, Lonergan 
quotes Ecclesiastes 41-3 and 817, then references Ecclesiastes 92, 3, 11, 12 and 105-7.313 Between the 
quote from Ecclesiastes 41-3 and Ecclesiastes 817, Lonergan quotes Ecclesiastes 49-12, a scripture 
discussing friendship, something not included in the first sketch. The fourteenth revision is that 
Lonergan has written “Hamlet’s soliloquies” on the left side of the page beside Ecclesiastes 41-
3.314 Hamlet is not referenced in the first sketch.  
In the final lines of the third page, Lonergan references Socrates, just as he does in the 
first sketch. In the revised sketch, however, there are two apparent differences. In the first sketch, 
Lonergan underlines the word “why”315, he does not do this in the revised sketch. Lastly, in the 
revised sketch he references “Socrates gad-fly,”316 something we do not see in the first sketch.  
While it is the main intention of this chapter merely to present and provide a minimal 
context for understanding the materials, there are some shifts and changes that stand out and 
would be worth investigating further. In the revised sketch, Lonergan references Ecclesiastes 
49-12, a passage on the topic of friendship. This is an interesting addition to the text that seems 
311 Ibid., 1, section 3, line 5. 
312 Ibid., 1, section 3, line 6. 
313 Ibid., 3, section 2, line 25. 
314 Ibid., 3, section 2, lines 13-18. 
315 Ibid., 1, section 3, line 7. 
316 Ibid., 3, section 2, line 26. 
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somewhat out of place when we consider it in the context of the surrounding verses. Ecclesiastes 
49-12 reads: 
Two are better than one, because they have a good reward for their toil. For 
if they fall, one will lift up his fellow. But woe to him who is alone when he 
falls and has not another to lift him up! Again, if two lie together, they keep 
warm, but how can one keep warm alone? And though a man might prevail 
against one who is alone, two will withstand him—a threefold cord is not 
quickly broken.317  
The reference to friendship is placed between Ecclesiastes 41-3, a verse that suggests the dead are 
more favored than the living, and Ecclesiastes 817, a verse that suggests life is incomprehensible. 
The topic of friendship seems to be out of place given this context. However, if we grant some 
weight to what appears to be an increasing interest in Aristotle’s ethics then the addition makes 
sense given the fact that Book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics is about friendship.  
Another revision worth further investigation is the addition of the reference to Socrates 
gad-fly. As we may recall, Socrates believed he was similar to the gad-fly, his purpose was to 
remind the state of its proper duties and obligations. Perhaps the addition of friendship and the 
reference to Socrates’ gad-fly are connected. The GE sketches may suggest that like the gad-fly, 
human beings are responsible for reminding one another of their proper duties and obligations. 
This action, like we see in Ecclesiastes 49-12, would result in the preservation of humankind. This 
of course is only a hypothesis and should be treated as such. Further investigation is required.  
[Page 4] Sketch Two – Section Three: 
As previously discussed, “Buddha – desire an illusion ∴ escape to x”318 is now located in 
the second section of the revised sketch. Also, it may be important to restate that this section is 
317 Ecclesiastes 49-12 (ESV).  
318 Originally located as GE sketches, 1, section 4, line 1. 
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where the second division, a discussion of ἀνήρ ψυχικὸς (natural man) begins. In the first sketch, 
Lonergan uses the phrase “assertion of moral law,”319 in the revised sketch, it is changed to 
“assertion of morality.”320 Lonergan divides the section into two categories in the revised sketch, 
the first deals with the Gorgias Dialogue and the second with the Republic. These are the same 
texts referred to in the first sketch, but this time he uses the Gorgias to (α) negate the ideal of the 
imagination and (β) affirm the good – at any cost.321 In the first sketch, the Gorgias was only 
used to negate the spontaneous idea of happiness.322 We may recall that for Kant, happiness is 
the ideal of the imagination, not of reason.323 The change in wording in this section mirrors the 
earlier discussed revisions to the title of first section where it changes from “spontaneous notion 
of happiness”324 to “ideal of the imagination.”325   
Sketch Two – Sections Four and Five: 
In the first sketch, Lonergan places Stoicism and Augustine in section five. They are 
divided into their own sections in the second sketch, allowing for a more elaborate exploration of 
each. Lonergan links the two sections with an arrow in the revised sketch. In the first sketch, this 
section is titled “Moral Theory,”326 in the revised sketch that title disappears. Section four is 
titled “Development of Morality.”327 Section four does not introduce anything not found in the 
first sketch, but “philosophy a way of life”328 is relocated from the first section to this section in 
319 Ibid., 1, section 4, line 2. 
320 Ibid., 4, section 3, line 1. 
321 Ibid., 4, section Three, lines 2 and 3. 
322 Ibid., 1, section 4, line 3. 
323 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 35. 
324 The title as it appears in the first sketch: GE sketches, 1, section 2, line 1. 
325 Ibid., 3, section 1, line 1. 
326 Ibid., 1, section 5, line 1. 
327 Ibid., 4, section 4, line 1. 
328 Ibid., 1, section 1, line 2. 
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the revised sketch. In the first sketch, it references “Augustine amor sapientiae,”329 so it is not 
unusual for it to be used as a lead up to section five titled “Augustine.”330 As we may recall, 
amor sapientiae means “love of wisdom.” What we might add, especially in light of the 
extensive exploration of development in Insight (chapter 15), is the link that emerges here 
between ‘development’ and ‘a way of life.’  In “Insight Revisited,” Lonergan’s speaks of “the 
correction of my hitherto normative or classicist notion of culture”331 that began with his reading 
of Dawson in 1930. Here we have some textual evidence of the shift in progress in 1934. In 
Insight his understanding of ethics is fully informed by his understanding of human living and is 
dynamic and in development. This is in stark contrast to the static ideal of consistency in Kant’s 
categorical imperative.  
In the revised sketch, section five elaborates on Lonergan’s reading of Augustine. We see 
an additional development of this topic on the fifth page, which I will explore in the second half 
of this chapter. In the revised sketch, Lonergan lists three points in the section on Augustine. 
Firstly, there is the notion of beata vita, which Lonergan takes from the Cassiciacum 
Dialogues. The English title reads “On a Happy Life”.332 Secondly, he lists: Idea of development 
– amore coelestium expugnatur amor terrestris.333 A literal translation of the Latin is: “heavenly
love refutes earthly love.” Lonergan links this section to Stoicism in the last section with an 
arrow.334 Lastly, we read: lex aeterna (eternal law), something that we are introduced to in the 
first sketch.335 In the sketches, he connects lex aeterna to Scholasticism with an arrow.  
329 Ibid. 
330 Ibid., 4, section 5, line 1. 
331 CWL2, 264. 
332 The Latin title of the dialogue is “De Beata Vita” (On a Happy Life). 
333 GE sketches, 4, section 5, line 2. 
334 DT, 5. 
335 GE sketches, 1, section 5, line 2. 
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Sketch Two – Section Six: 
Section six in the revised sketch offers very little additional information. The section is 
titled “Examination of Kant.”336 I suspect that this section intends to deal directly with what 
Lonergan addressed in his notes on Kant (File A12). File A12, then, would provide the extensive 
and detailed expansion that is suggested in the section title. In the first sketch, section six 
includes a discussion of the progress of philosophy according to St. Thomas, but that is removed 
in the revised sketch.  
Sketch Two – Section Seven: 
As previously discussed, this section marks the beginning of the third division of text, 
dealing with the spiritual man (ἀνήρ πνευματικός). The section is titled “Scholastic System – 
Rights and duties.”337 Most of the material from the first sketch is found in the revised sketch, 
the most notable change is the ordering of the text. Lonergan is more precise in the revised 
sketch, making section seven much shorter than it is in the first sketch. In the first sketch, 
Lonergan uses the following order: a more precise foundation of ethics, “man as instrument,” 
“faith and supernatural act,” the dialectics of history, action, virtues, motive and then spiritual 
life. In the revised version of the sketch, he discusses: the scholastic system, a foundation of 
ethics, action, freedom, man as an instrument, the dialectics of history, and then elaborates on 
action again.  
           There are a few additions to the revised sketch. In the first sketch we read: “dynamic 
[amor sapientiae] as well as more precise foundation of ethic,” in the revised sketch it changes to: 
“Giving a local habitation and a name to the dictate of reason of the scholastic - presenting ethics 
336 Ibid., 4, section 6, line 1. 
337 Ibid., 4, section 7, line 1. 
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not juridically but dynamically.”338 As we have already mentioned, Lonergan’s understanding of 
ethics in Insight is fully informed by his understanding of human living and is dynamic, which is 
a stark contrast to the static ideal of consistency found in Kant’s categorical imperative. The 
development from a “more precise foundation of ethic” to “presenting ethics not juridically but 
dynamically” can be understood as an early development toward Lonergan’s understanding of 
ethics in chapter 18 of Insight. 
In the revised sketch, Lonergan has written “economic scientific”339 beside “occupation” 
in the section on action. It is not written in the first sketch. Lastly, following the line “action as 
effective,”340 Lonergan has added “κατ' εξοχήν.”341 Finally, there is a lot of material from the 
first sketch that does not appear in the revised sketch. Most notably, the topics “Faith and 
supernatural act,”342 “Virtues,” “Motivation,” and “Spiritual Life” do not appear in the revised 
sketch. Also, Christianity as a solution for the dialectic of history and direct references to Kant 
are not included in the revised sketch.  
We have now analyzed the relationship between the first and second sketch. Although 
some revisions and developments occur, the envisage project remains the same. The second 
sketch is a revised version of the project outlined in the first sketch, which is a response to 
Lonergan’s understanding of Kant’s notion of the metaphysic of customs. The third sketch, 
although related to the quest for happiness found in the first two sketches, is a separate item that 
we will now turn our attention to.   
338 Ibid., 4, section 7, lines 3-4. 
339 Ibid., 4, section 7, line 8. 
340 Ibid., 4, section 7, line 10. 
341 Ibid., 4, section 7, line 11. 
342 Ibid., 2, section 7, line 9. 
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Page Five – “Happiness” 
The last page in file A13 appears to be one of two things: it is either a continuation of the 
second sketch, or an entity of its own. I think that, although it connects to the quest for happiness 
found in both sketches, it is a separate item. I have two arguments to support my claim. Firstly, 
as previously discussed, the two sketches are titled “General Ethic [Metaphysic of Customs]” 
while the third outline appears to be titled “Happiness.” “Happiness” is underlined twice in the 
top left hand corner of the page.343 The page is clearly related to the envisage project as it 
contains a repetition of much of the material found in the other sketches. If nothing else, the page 
is a third revision of the envisage project, not a continuation of the second sketch. My second 
argument requires an analysis of the original, non-transcribed file. As we may recall, I have 
attached the original archive file as an appendix at the end of this project. If we look at the 
division between the fourth and fifth pages, we see something not captured in the transcribed 
version. The writing stops about halfway down the fourth page, suggesting the second sketch 
ends there. If the fifth page is a continuation of the second sketch it would make sense for it to be 
written on the same page, not start on a new one. The fifth page is clearly a division of its own.  
Unlike the two sketches, page five does not contain left hand enumerations, but is clearly 
divided into four subtopics: Impulse, Aristotle, Buddha, and Plato. Page five is a repetition of 
much of the same material found in the other sketches. It is possible that it is a further revised 
version of the first two sketches, but if that is the case, it appears to be incomplete. All this 
suggests to me that the page is a separate reflection on happiness. Although much of the material 
can be found in the other sketches, the layout of the text is different. If my hypothesis is correct, 
the notes read 1) happiness as it relates to impulse 2) Aristotle’s notion of happiness, 3) 
343 Ibid., 5. 
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happiness as it relates to the Buddha, and 4) a discussion of Plato on happiness. 
I approach the page under the assumption that it is an outline on happiness. As we have 
previously discussed, the sketches are primarily concerned with the quest for happiness, just as 
the notes on Kant are in search of as systematic attainment of happiness. These points are driven 
home in the third sketch.  
Impulse 
The first section deals with the relationship between happiness and impulse. The first half 
of the section reads: “Impulse ideal of the imagination – anticipation greater than event (am I 
enjoying myself) - cf. Kant (no possibility of system)”344 We have seen most of these things in 
the previous sketches. The “ideal of the imagination” appears in the second section of the first 
sketch and again in the first and third sections of the second sketch. As we may recall, it deals 
directly with the quest for happiness in both sketches. The reference to Kant also appears in both 
sketches. The line “anticipation greater than event (am I enjoying myself)” is a new addition to 
the text.  The next portion of the section deals with reflection. The topic of reflection is included 
in the previous sketches, but is not discussed in the extensive manner that it appears in this 
section. With the exception of the quotations from Ecclesiastes, this is the first time that the 
sketches offer a hint of Lonergan’s own self-reflection breaking through. I find this section an 
insightful tool for understanding elements of the first two sketches. Lonergan is clearly 
highlighting a need for a shift in perspective, from a focus on the present to the future. We note 
as well that in the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” there is a section called “D. We turn to the 
philosophic estimate of the future.”345 This is all in accord with his interest in history not only as 
344 Ibid. 5, section 1, lines 1-2. 
345 LEER, 30. 
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a remembrance of the past but as an anticipation of the future that is emerging in his thought at 
this time and which ultimately becomes the line of division for movement from data to results in 
the method of functional specialization. He writes about this division, “The first principle of the 
division is that theological operations occur in two phases… In brief, there is a theology in 
oratione obliqua that tells what Paul and John, Augustine and Aquinas, and anyone else had to 
say about God and the economy of salvation. But there is also a theology in oratione recta in 
which the theologian, enlightened by the past, confronts the problems of his own day.”346 
Lonergan does not ignore the reality of impulse and desire, like the Buddha, rather he 
acknowledges its existence and then adds to it. Like Kant, Lonergan searches for an 
understanding of happiness that encapsulates both motive and desire.347 He appears to use this 
section as a tool for shifting attention away from desire as negative or troublesome to a notion of 
motive and desire as a positive orientation, which in light of the central significance of the notion 
of the pure desire to know in Insight, is worth noting.  
Aristotle 
In the second section, Lonergan offers insight into his reading of Aristotle. This section 
provides useful data for understanding Lonergan’s developing understanding of Aristotle and for 
understanding the role of references to Aristotle within the sketches. The section reads: 
“Aristotle [places happiness] in an ἐνέργεια, some form of activity [,] not in possessing 
something outside of self but in being active in a satisfying way.” Lonergan then lists two types 
of activity and a type of motivation for acting. The first is the activity of the divine mind 
346 Method in Theology, 133. 
347 KN, 11. 
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(Aristotle’s Metaphysics 1074b15-1075a10). The second is the activity of moral virtues. The 
third reads: “mass of men: fear of punishment, hope of rewards.”348  
Lonergan’s notes on Aristotle highlight three movements that influence human action. 
First, there is the activity of the divine mind that influences what we know, which in turn holds 
potential for influencing human action. Second, there is the activity of moral virtues, habitual 
patterns inspired by our morals that we have developed over time. These habitual patterns can 
influence decision making, just as our understanding does. Lastly, human action can be 
influenced by hope or fear.  
Buddha 
As previously discussed, the Buddha seeks to avoid desire because it is an illusion that 
keeps man from becoming one with all living things. For the Buddha, desire is an illusionary 
trick that keeps the ego-consciousness alive. As earlier mentioned, Lonergan does not ignore the 
reality of desire. Lonergan acknowledges the existence of desire and rather than strive to escape 
from it, he searches for an understanding of happiness that incorporates motive and desire. The 
first level of the good, as detailed in chapter 18 of Insight, is desire. Also worth noting, Lonergan 
equates being with the pure desire to know in this same chapter.349 
Plato 
The last section of GE notes reads: “Plato: the good: at any cost. (Gorgias).”350 Lonergan 
does not provide any additional information in this section so it is difficult to formulate opinions 
348 GE sketches, 5, section 2, line 6. 
349 CWL3, 596.  
350 GE sketches, 5, section 4, line 1. 
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on what he wanted to communicate. We can however, compare this section to relevant portions 
of the first two sketches. In the third section of the revised sketch, we see a very similar 
reference: “Assertion of Morality [Gorgias] Plato’s Socrates. (α) Negation of ideal of 
imagination re. pleasure and pain (β) affirmation of the good – at any cost.”351 The final section 
of the third sketch appears to be a more developed version of the third section from the second 
sketch. If my analysis of the previous section is correct, Lonergan has shifted attention from desire as a 
negative notion and has given it a positive orientation. If I am correct, “(α) Negation of ideal of 
imagination re. pleasure and pain” is no longer a required discussion. Therefore, Lonergan can focus 
entirely on Plato’s notion of “the good at any cost” in this section. Desire is no longer a problem. 
Once again, we see a connection to the first level of the good in chapter 18 of Insight. Lonergan 
connects his notion of the good and his understanding of desire in the first level of the good.  
Summary 
In this chapter we have identified three distinct divisions within the GE notes: the original 
envisage project, a revised version of that project, and a separate sketch on happiness. We 
have compared all three sketches, tracking the revision that occurs between the first and 
second sketches. The third sketch is considered to be separate from the other sketches, but 
connected nevertheless; it clearly reveals a bit of Lonergan’s own self-reflection for the first 
time in the GE sketches. The sketches are three snapshots that capture Lonergan’s 
understanding of the notion of the metaphysic of ethics as it first begins to develop. As we will 
see in the following chapter, the GE sketches provide a glimpse of the origins of chapter 18 in 
Insight.  
351 Ibid., 4, section 3, lines 1-3. 
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Chapter Five: Connecting the GE Sketches to Insight 
In the first chapter I establish the significance of the GE sketches and provide some initial 
context for them. Chapter two provides an annotated transcription of the file. Chapters three and 
four are a comparative analysis of the three sketches contained within the file. In the following 
chapter, I will connect the GE sketches to chapter 18 of Insight, showing that they are a 
preliminary attempt at understanding the relationship between metaphysics and ethics. The 
following quote is of fundamental importance:  
"There follows a conclusion of fundamental importance, namely, the parallel 
and interpenetration of metaphysics and ethics. For just as the dynamic 
structure of our knowing grounds a metaphysics, so the prolongation of that 
structure into human doing grounds an ethics."352   
I open with this quote from Insight because I believe it clearly expresses the connection 
between the GE sketches and Insight. In the quote, Lonergan links the structure of metaphysics 
to the structure of ethics. The quote is a key for understanding the GE sketches. Read from the 
context of Chapter 18 of Insight, the sketches are highlighted as a first attempt at 
understanding the relationship between metaphysics and ethics, which bears mature fruit in 
Insight. At minimum, the GE sketches are stark evidence that Lonergan was thinking about 
ethics much earlier in his development than is commonly supposed. Not only can we link the 
notes to chapter 18, we can also connect them to other chapters of Insight. In this chapter, I 
will directly connect Lonergan’s GE sketches to chapter 18 and relevant portions of chapters 
15 and 20.  
352 CWL3, 602.  
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Chapter XVIII: The Possibility of Ethics 
At the beginning of chapter 18, Lonergan clearly states his intentions for the chapter: 
             Metaphysics was conceived as the implementation of the integral heurist ic 
structure of proportionate being. The fundamental question of the present 
chapter is whether ethics can be conceived in the same fashion. Our answer, 
which prolongs the discussion of questions raised in the chapters on common 
sense and in the study of human development, meets the issue in three steps.353 
 We can link Lonergan’s answer to this question to the passage that I have quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter. The GE sketches are evidently related to this discussion. If nothing 
else, the title “General Ethic [Metaphysics of Customs]” suggests the relationship of the GE 
sketches to this discussion. There are of course, as we will discuss in the remainder of this 
section, other arguments that connect the GE sketches to this chapter. It is important to note that 
the sketches, like chapter 18, are not concerned with drawing up a code of ethics but with 
meeting the relevant prior, foundational, questions.354 In the GE sketches, Lonergan’s effort 
begins as an attempt at a systematic understanding of happiness as the goal of human living, in 
the end he does this, but also creates a sketch for the metaphysic of ethics. In chapter 18, he 
argues that the structure of ethics and the structure of metaphysics are intrinsically related. With 
this in mind, we can connect portions of the GE sketches to the notion of the good, the notion of 
will, and the ontology of the Good that emerge in Insight. 
The Notion of the Good 
There is a clear connection between the GE sketches and the notion of the good in 
353 CWL3, 595.  
354 Ibid. 
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chapter 18. I have briefly mentioned these connections in chapter three. Lonergan’s discussion of 
the spontaneous notion of happiness, later called “the ideal of the imagination,”355 clearly 
connects to the first level of the good. In chapter 18, he writes: “On an elementary level, the 
good is the object of desire and, when it is attained, it is experienced as pleasant, enjoyable, 
satisfying. But man experiences aversion no less than desire, pain no less than pleasure; and so, 
on this elementary, empirical level, the good is coupled with its opposite, the bad.”356 It is clear 
that Lonergan associated the first level of the good with the empirical experience of feeling 
happy, that is a particular good.  At this level, we are satisfied (happy) when we obtain the 
particular object of desire, that is, the spontaneous notion of happiness found in the GE sketches. 
Thus Lonergan writes: “Reason [is] a means for the satisfaction of impulse, desire.”357 Bentham 
is one example provided in this section. We can locate Bentham’s understanding of the goal of 
happiness at this level; searching for happiness as an empirical end coincides with the first level 
of the good.  
 In the notes on happiness, he writes: “one can simply drift without asking questions. 
Reflection: life is passing; what am I getting out of it. No doubt about desire, yearning, passion, 
but where is it all leading.”358 This quote clearly connects the spontaneous notion of happiness 
with the first level of the good, but also suggests a connection, at least in the transition into, the 
second level of the good in chapter 18. In this quote, Lonergan expresses a clear dissatisfaction 
in empirical obtainment of happiness. He writes:  
            However, among men’s many desires, there is one that is unique. It is the 
detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know. As other desire, it has its 
                                                                 
355 See my discussion of this in chapter four.  
356 Bernard Lonergan, “The Possibility of Ethics” in Insight: a Study of Human Understanding Collected Works of 
Bernard Lonergan, Volume 3. Edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1992), 596. 
357 GE notes, 3, section 1. 
358 Ibid., 5. 
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satisfaction. But unlike other desire, it is not content with. Of itself, it heads 
beyond one’s own joy in one’s own insight to the further question whether one’s 
own insight is correct. It is a desire to know and its immanent criterion is the 
attainment of an unconditioned that, by the fact that it is unconditioned, is 
independent of the individual’s likes and dislikes, of his wishful and his anxious 
thinking.359  
 
In the quote from the GE sketches we can see a clear connection to this passage from chapter 18. 
In the GE sketches we find a nascent notion of the pure desire to know, which grounds the 
dynamic of his metaphysic, in his reflection on the happiness as a goal or end.  
 The second aspect of the good is the good of order. Lonergan writes: “Now through this 
desire [to know] and the knowledge it generates, there comes to light a second meaning of the 
good. Beside the good that is simply object of desire, there is the good of order. Such is the 
polity, the economy, the family as an institution…the good of order is dynamic…it possesses its 
own normative line of development…”360 The GE sketches anticipate this later development of 
the good of order as a distinct, and higher, level of the good. In the first sketch, Lonergan deals 
with the topic of action. He divides the section into three topics, action as: moral, ἐνέργεια, and 
effective. Under effective, he lists: 1) Economic division of labour 2) Family 3) Science, art, 
Research and teaching 4) giving morally – estote imitators mea.361 This section is clearly related 
to the later notion of the good of order. In fact, Lonergan lists the economy and the family 
institution in both texts.  
 The third aspect of the good is value. In chapter 18 we read: “This brings us to the third 
aspect of the good, which is value. For the good of order is linked, not only with the manifold 
manifestations of spontaneous desires and aversions which it orders, but also with a third type of 
                                                                 
359 CWL3, 596.  
360 Ibid., 596-597.  
361 GE sketches, 2, section 7. 
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good that emerges on the level of reflection and judgment, of deliberation and choice.”362 We 
can further connect the GE sketches to chapter 18 through this passage. Again, we turn attention 
to the section on action in the GE sketches. The text reads: “Action – as moral – absolute 
value.”363 The passage is repeated in the second sketch.364 There is not enough detail in this 
section to build a connection as strong as the connection to the other levels of the good, but it 
expresses a connection nevertheless. On its own, it is not an overly persuasive argument, but 
placed in context of the overall argument, it holds significance as part of an early outline of 
chapter 18.  
Now that we have established a clear connection between the GE sketches and the notion 
of the good, we turn attention to the notion of will. The notion of will connects to discussions of 
the nature of the will, rationalization, and morality in the GE sketches.  
The Notion of Will 
In chapter 18, Lonergan establishes will, willingness, and willing.365 Will is a capacity: 
“Will, then, is intellectual or spiritual appetite. As capacity for sensitive hunger stands to sensible 
food, so will stands to objects presented by intellect. As a bare capacity, will extends to every 
intellectual object, and so both to every possible order and to every concrete object as subsumed 
under some possible order.”366 Willingness is a developed habit: “Just as a person that has not 
learnt a subject must go through a laborious process to acquire mastery…so too a person that has 
not acquired willingness needs to be persuaded before he will, yet once willingness is acquired, 
362 CWL3, 597.  
363 Ibid. 
364 GE sketches, 4, section 7. 
365 CWL3, 598.  
366 Ibid.   
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leaps to willing without any need of persuasion.”367 Willing is human action: “willing is rational 
and so moral…so it is that the detached and disinterested desire extends its sphere of influence 
from the field of cognitional activities through the field of knowledge into the field of deliberate 
human acts.”368 Definitions of the three aspects of the will are important when connecting the 
GE sketches to chapter 18.  
In the GE sketches, it is clear that Lonergan intends to discuss the nature of the will. In 
fact, he lists “Nature of Will, Obligation, Freedom” as part of a discussion on a more precise 
foundation of ethic in the first sketch.369 Will as a capacity is somewhat of a requirement for 
discussing the quest for happiness. In the quest for happiness in the GE sketches, happiness is 
what satisfies the appetite of the will. Without the capacity to will, there would not be a desire 
for happiness.  
It is difficult to connect willingness explicitly to the GE sketches. There are no direct 
references to ‘willingness’ or the establishment of habits. It is possible that willingness, as its 
own distinct notion, had yet to appear in Lonergan’s understanding of the notion of the will. The 
term is not used in the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology” or in “Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis.” It is 
possible that the focus of the project, as Lonergan envisaged it in 1934, may not have required an 
extensive discussion of the development of habit. Once he seriously encounters Aquinas in his 
thesis, this will of course change as virtue or habit is a central component of Aquinas’ 
discussion of ethics. We can loosely link the development of habits with “Development of 
Morality – Stoicism” from the second sketch.370 The GE sketches do not provide enough detail 
for us to argue that Lonergan makes an explicit connection between the two.  
367 CWL3, 598.  
368 Ibid.,  598-599. 
369 GE sketches, 1, section 7. 
370 Ibid., 4, section 4. 
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Unlike willingness, we can connect the GE sketches to willing. Willing, as we have 
already established, is an action. The GE sketches are full of references pertaining to action. The 
key is to link the references to chapter 18. Finding references to action in the GE sketches is not 
enough to strongly connect it to chapter 18. What we need is a reference that places action 
(willing) in relation to will and willingness. As we have already seen, the capacity of the will, the 
development of habits, and human action, are entities that can be connected to most of the 
thinkers referenced in the GE sketches. To demonstrate that they are explicit connection to 
chapter 18, these notions need to, at the very least, appear together in the text. The only place 
that a reference like this appears is in section seven.371 In that section, titled a “more precise 
foundation of ethic,”372 Lonergan references the human act, the nature of will, and 
rationalization. 
What we can say for certain is that Lonergan was thinking about the topics of human 
action, the development morality, and the will during the composition of the GE sketches. We 
cannot directly link the GE sketches to the understanding of will, willingness, and willing found 
in chapter 18. We can however, argue that Lonergan’s thoughts found in the GE sketches helped 
shape the understanding of ethics found in chapter 18. At the very least, we can argue that 
Lonergan was thinking about the notions found in chapter 18, prior to the composition of Insight. 
In this same manner, we can, at the very least, argue that Lonergan was thinking about 
the notions of freedom and reflection when composing the GE sketches. The notion of freedom 
is discussed in section two of chapter 18373 and is mentioned in section seven of the GE 
sketches.374 Lonergan notes reflection several times throughout the GE sketches: “Reflective 
371 GE sketches, 1, section 7. 
372 Ibid.  
373 CWL3, 607.  
374 GE sketches, 1, section 7 and GE sketches, 4, Section 7 
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character of philosophy – life, an object of reflection,”375 “Reflection [Ecclesiastes] 48,” and 
most prominently in the notes on happiness: “Needed a bit of reflectiveness: one can simply drift 
without asking questions. Reflection: life is passing; what am I getting out of it. No doubt about 
desire, yearning, passion, but where is it all leading.”376 Lonergan discusses practical reflection 
in section 2.4 of chapter 18.377 
 
The Ontology of the Good 
 The GE sketches can be connected to chapter 18 in one final way. In a section titled “The 
Ontology of the Good” we read:  
 
 …our analysis has been concerned with the good in human sense, with objects 
of desire, intelligible orders, terminal and originating values. But as the close 
relations between metaphysics and ethics suggest, it should be possible to 
generalize this notion and, indeed, to conceive the good as identical with the 
intelligibility that is intrinsic to being. The main line of the generalization are 
grasped easily enough…we propose to speak of a potential, formal, and actual 
good, where the potential good is identical with potential intelligibility and so 
includes but also extends beyond objects of desire, where the formal good is 
identical with formal intelligibility and so includes but also extends beyond 
human intelligible orders, where the actual good is identical with actual 
intelligibilities and so includes but also may extend beyond human values. 378  
 
 
In this passage we are again reminded that Lonergan parallels the structure of metaphysics with 
the structure of ethics. 
  The evidence clearly points to the conclusion that the GE sketches are an early attempt to 
work out the relationship between the structure of metaphysics and the structure of ethics. The 
                                                                 
375 Ibid. 1, Section 1. 
376 Ibid. 5. 
377 CWL3, 610-612. 
378 CWL3, 604-605.  
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GE sketches do not provide an elaborative discussion of the potential, formal, and actual good, 
but may be a foundation for developing these ideas. Within the GE sketches there is a gradual 
shift in focus that begins with materialistic objects of desire, where for example, the Soviet is 
equated with the good379 and moves toward the notion of transcendent intelligence, which 
Lonergan calls “Faith.”380 Lonergan clearly recognizes a shift in intelligibility in the GE 
sketches; there is a shift in perspective that stretches from a focus on the materialistic through to 
a focus on the nature of man and lastly to a focus on the supernatural.  
Undeveloped Notions in the GE sketches 
Now that we have highlighted the connections between the GE sketches and chapter 18 
of Insight, we must also mention briefly that the entirety of chapter 18 is not found in the GE 
sketches. The GE sketches are an early sketch of the notion of ethics from chapter 18. In the 
chapter, we also see the topics of essential and effective freedom,381 possible functions of satire 
and humour,382 moral impotence,383 and the problem of liberation.384 These topics do not appear 
anywhere in the GE sketches and most likely occurred as later developments in Lonergan’s 
understanding of Ethics. 
Connecting the Sketches to other Chapters of Insight 
We can further connect the GE sketches to Insight through two passages, one in chapter 
15 and the other in chapter 20. I briefly mention these passages in chapter three. We shift our 
379 GE sketches, 1, section 1. 
380 Ibid., 2, section 7. 
381 CWL3, 619-624. 
382 Ibid., 624-626.  
383 Ibid., 627-630. 
384 Ibid., 630-633. 
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attention to them. 
The Notion of Finality: Chapter 15 
We can further connect the GE sketches to Insight through Lonergan’s notion of finality. 
Although they offer little detail, the GE sketches include a notion of finality: “Finality – Good-
True or Impulse (Nature of Will, Obligation, Freedom).”385 As we have previously discussed in 
chapter three, about eight years after writing the GE sketches, Lonergan composed an essay titled 
“Finality, Love, Marriage.” In the essay, he provides a definition for finality: “…Finality is 
affirmed, besides the absolute reference of all things to God and the horizontal reference of each 
thing to its commensurate motives and ends, a vertical dynamism and tendency, an upthurst from 
lower to higher levels of appetition and process; thus are provided the empty categories of the 
ultimate solution, since horizontal ends are shown to be more essential and vertical ends more 
excellent.”386 We also find a definition of finality in chapter 15 of Insight: “By finality we refer 
to a theorem of the same generality as the notion of being. This theorem affirms a parallelism 
between the dynamism of the mind and the dynamism of proportionate being.”387 Because of the 
GE sketches, we can track the origin of the notion of finality, found in chapter 15, to an earlier 
origin than “Finality, Love, Marriage.”  
Chapter 20 
We can connect the GE sketches to chapter 20 through a discussion of the supernatural. 
385 GE sketches. 1, section 7. 
386 Bernard Lonergan, “Finality, Love, Marriage” in Collected Works Volume 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1993), 18.  
387 CWL3, 445. 
Like in the discussion on the ontology of the good, we see a reach beyond ourselves in this
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chapter. In the GE sketches, a discussion of faith and supernature is placed before a discussion 
on the dialectic of history and sin.388 We can connect these topics to chapter 15, where Lonergan 
writes:  
when this problem of evil is met by a supernatural solution, human perfection 
itself becomes a limit to be transcended, and then, the dialectic is transformed 
from a bipolar to a tripolar conjunction and opposition. The humanist 
viewpoint loses its primacy, not by some extrinsicist invasion, but by 
submitting to its own immanent necessities. For if the humanist is to stand by 
the exigencies of his own unrestricted desire, if he is to yield to the demands 
for openness set by every further question, then he will discover the limitat ions 
that imply man’s incapacity for sustained development, he will acknowledge 
and consent to the one solution that exists and, if that solution is supernatura l, his 
very humanism will lead beyond itself.89 
In both the GE sketches and chapter 20, we see a supernatural solution for the problem of sin, 
which is essentially a proof for the existence of God. In the GE sketches Lonergan equates 
spiritual life with the supernaturalised man.390 He further connects it as a “union with God – an 
intellectual orientation.”391 The two texts are clearly related, establishing a final connection 
between the GE sketches and Insight. 
Summary 
In brief summary, we have established a connection between the GE sketches and chapter 
18 of Insight. The GE sketches provide an early sketch of chapter 18, much like the History File 
provides us with the earliest sketches for the elements of chapters 6, 7 and 20 of Insight.392 The 
notion of ethics in chapter 18 is clearly connected to the GE sketches. They are a significant tool 
388 GE sketches, 1, section 7. 
389 CWL3, 728. 
390 GE sketches, 2.  
391 Ibid.  
392 OLNDH, 67-111.  
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for understanding Lonergan’s early development and have been overlooked within the body of 
existing literature. At the very least, my project has established their significance and calls for 
further attention to the file. We have also established a connection between the GE sketches and 
chapters 15 and 20 of Insight and have noted portions of chapter 18 that do not appear in the GE 
sketches. 
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Epilogue 
The Lonergan Archive File, A13, titled “General Ethic [Metaphysic of Customs],” has 
been examined extensively throughout this project. My project, although focused on the 
preliminary function of research, has dated the sketches, corrected errors made in earlier 
transcriptions of the file, highlighted three distinct sketches within the file, and provided research 
that clears up references within the text, bringing us one step closer to interpreting the text. I 
suspect the text is significant in ways that we are yet to uncover. I have linked the file to portions 
of Insight, but suspect that I am only beginning to uncover the full extent of the relationship 
between the two texts.  
At the very minimum, I hope the significance of this file to the larger body of Lonergan 
scholarship has been established. As we have seen in the last five chapters, the sketches relate to 
the “Essay in Fundamental Sociology,” Lonergan’s early work and development, Kant’s I 
Fondamenti della Metaphysical dei Costumi, Lonergan’s understanding of Ethics found in 
chapter 18 of Insight, and the notion of the dialectic of history. We have also seen hints of the 
sketches in some of Lonergan’s other texts, such as “Pantôn Anakephalaiôsis” and “Finality, 
Love, Marriage.” Moving forward, a more comprehensive exploration of any of these 
connections would be beneficial to the existing body of knowledge on Lonergan.  
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